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Ill the Supretne Court of the
State of Utah

EMIL J. JACOBSON and DAISY T.
JACOBSON, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
GEORGE W. SWAN AND LEONA
SWAN, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

CASE
NO. 8050

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of so called facts contained in appellants'
brief is so limited in its scope that in our view much of the
evidence of controlling importance is omitted therefrom.
We are unable to agree that appellants' statement sets forth
all of the controlling and important terms of the three
agreements, Plaintiffs' Exhibits F-G and H. These are the
same documents referred to in the pleadings and memorandums and Findings and Conclusions of the court as Exhibit
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A, the Uniform Real Estate Contract; Exhibit B, the first
lease, dated ApriL _ _ , 1949; and Exhibit C, the second
lease, dated June 27, 1950. We shall refer to them herein
respectively as real estate contract, first lease, and second
lease.
There are also some statements made by appellants
with which we do not agree. On page 4 of appellant's brief
the statement is made that by March, 1949, appellants had
become in arrears in payments and that the amount was
disputed. The appellants were in arrears at that time, and
the amount of the delinquency was not disputed. It was
$889.41, including contract payments, taxes, insurance and
water assessments. The Complaint alleges it (R. 6, par. 11).
Exhibit B (Plaintiffs' Exhibit G) attached to the Complaint
in paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) thereof (R. 14), which was
signed by all the parties to this action, recites that said
amount of $889.41 represented the total amount due by the
lessees under said Uniform Real Estate Contract attached
thereto, but not paid. Defendants in their Answer admit
that they did not make payments strictly in conformance
with the provisions as set forth in said real estate contract
(R. 19, par. 6). The court, in its Memorandum !Decision of
February 21, 1953, found that amount unpaid at said time
on the real estate contract (R. 39, second paragraph, R. 45).
The court so found in its Findings of Fact, (R. 95, par. 6)
(R. 98, par. 19). (Emil J. Jacobson' Deposition, page 20,
lines 5-10). (George Swan's Deposition, page 5, lines 5-25).
In quoting from these depositions we should make it
clear that the four depositions of the parties hereto have
been published and are a part of the record in this cause
(R. 70). (R. 93).
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We are unable to follow appellants' statement on page
13 of their brief, concerning the amount paid of $4687.41
and the $3287.41 there mentioned. On the same page (R.
71) on the second line should we think read (R. 81).
In order to determine the questions raised in this matter, we shall direct the attention of the Court to additional
evidence which we consider substantial and important.
The property involved is 1.20 acres of land in Orem,
Utah, with a house thereon and Y2 share of Provo Bench
water.
In June, 1947, said property was listed for sale with
Dixon Real Estate Company of Provo (R. 94). Respondent, Emil J. Jacobson, at that time a salesman for said company, was contacted by Swans about the place, and showed
the property to appellants for the purpose of selling it to
them (R. 94). (Emil Jacobson's Deposition, page 4, lines
16-18). Appellants sought to purchase said property for
the sum of $14,000.00, and agreed to pay as a down payment the sum of $6000.00, in accordance with the listing
agreement between Dixon Real Estate Company and one
P. K. Nielson, then owner thereof. The appellants were unable to consummate the purchase of the premises ·upon the
listing terms, but could and did pay to Dixon Real Estate
Company, agent of the seller, the sum of $4000.00 (R. 94).
(Emil Jacobson's Deposition, pages 8-9). R. 32-33). Nielson had gone so far with a deal on a farm in Idaho that
Jacobson felt obliged to help Nielson out, so he finally consented to pay and did pay Nielson $10,000.00 instead of
$8,000.00 and had the property deeded to Jacobsons and
sold it to Swans on a contract of sale (R. 33-35). R. 94-95).
P. K. Nielson conveyed the property to respondents by
Warranty Deed; and on June 27, 1947, respondents entered
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into the Uniform Real Estate Contract with Swans and sold
the property to Swans (Plaintiffs' Exhibit F). (R. 95). Mr.
Jacobson got $385.00, one-half the usual commission for
selling the property (Emil Jacobson's Deposition, page 17).
At that time Swans entered into possession of said
premises and remained in possession thereof continuously
until April 11, 1953, a period of almost six years (R. 95).
(R. 104).

Although Jacobsons did not receive the $4000.00 down
payment on the real estate contract, the contract recited a
total purchase price of $14,000.00, and the receipt of $4000.00 was therein acknowledged, but said $4000.00 was paid
by Swans to Dixon Real Estate Company, and that company paid it toP. K. Nielson (R. 94-95). Nielson therefore
received $14,000.00 cash for the property from Jacobsons
and Swans and stepped out of the picture leaving Jacobsons
in the position of a seller who now has to buy the property
back according to the lower court's decision. There was no
profit in the sale as far as Jacobsons are concerned.
The real estate contnwt provided for payments of $80.00
per month, with interest on the unpaid balance at the rate
of five per cent per annum, payable monthly, said payments
to apply first on interest and second on principal. It also
provides that the seller has the option to get a loan on the
property for not to exceed the unpaid balance of the contract at an interest rate of not to exceed five per cent per
annum. Buyer agrees to pay all general taxes, insurance
and assessments. It also provides for forfeiture of all payments made as liquidated da.ma.ge in case of default, and
that time is the essence of said a~ment, and for all costs
and expenses that may arise from enforcing said agreement,
including a reasonable attorney's fee (Plaintiffs' Exhibit F).
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Shortly after the execution of the real estate contract
Jacobsens obtained a loan of $5000.00 from Beneficial Life
Insurance Company, bearing interest at five per cent per
annum, payable in monthly installments of $39.55 per
month, and Jacobsons have been paying on the mortgage
given to secure that loan ever since they obtained the loan,
and there is still a balance due thereon of $3800.00 (R. 95).
{Emil Jacobson's Deposition, pages 19-20). Swans lmew, ·
or should have knewn, that this loan was made as the Beneficial Life Insuran·ce Company's appraisers went to the
premises with full knowledge of the defendants and appraised the property, and Swans didn't question the purpose
for which it was being appraised (R. 38). George Swan's
Deposition, page 4, lines 12-17). ·Out of the $80.00 monthly
payments, therefore, Jacobsons had to pay $39.55 each
month to the mortgagee and pay in addition thereto the
general taxes of approximately $100.00 per year, fire insurance premium of $26.00 each year ($78.00 each three
years), and $3.16 each year on water assessments ($9.50
for three years) . R. 97, par. 12) . (Emil J acobson'.s Deposition, page 23). Calculated on a monthly basis, the Jacobsons had to pay the following amounts per month to keep
their loan in good standing: $39.55 monthly payment on
loan; $8.33 on taxes; $2.16 on fire insurance, and $.26 on
water assessment, a total of $50.30 per month. Mr. Jacobson testified that the defendants have been continuously in
default for the past twenty month period, and that their
.average payments only amounted to fifty dollars per month
and they have never been up to date with their contnw18.
(Emil Jacobson's Deposition, page 24, lines 16-29).
In March, 1949, the Swans were delinquent in the sum
of $889.41. From June 27, 1947, to April, 1949, less than
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2 years, Swans had not paid the monthly installments on the
first day of each month as provided in the real estate con..
tract, and failed to pay the taxes, insurance premiums, assessments, and installments due for ~December, 1947, June,
July, August, 1948, and the first four months of the year
1949, a total of eight months missed out of 22 months, and
Jacobsons during all this time were obligated to pay $50.30
per month on the loan (R. 95, par. 6). (Plaintiffs' Exhibits
B and J). (Defendants' Exhibit 2). This delinquency is
admitted by Swans (Plaintiffs' Exhibit G). R. 6, par. 11).
( R. 19, par. 6). (George Swan's Deposition, page 5). The
delinquent taxes for 1948 and 1949 of $209.41, and fire insurance premiums of $78.00 were not paid until June 7,
1950, total sum being $287.41 (R. 81). (Plaintiffs' Exhibit
B). On March 11, 1949, Jacobsons served Swans with a
Notice to Quit (R. 95).
In April, 1949 the first lease, plaintiffs' Exhibit G, was
drawn up by Attorney Clyde Sandgren. Swans and Jacobsons met with the attorney and executed this lease. They
read it over and fully understood it (George Swan's Deposition, pages 5-6 and 16). (Leona Swan's Deposition, pages
2-3).
(Daisy Jacobson's Deposition, pages 4-5-6-7-8).
(Emil Jacobson's Deposition, page 16). It was understood
and agreed that any interest Swans had in the real estate
contract was cancelled and completely terminated by the
execution of the first lease, and that the first lease was substituted in its place, and that if the lease was performed according to its terms then Swans would have a right to enter into a new contract with Jacobsons for the purchase of
the property, but if Swans defaulted in the performance of
the terms of said lease, then the Jacobsons would have the
right to remove the Swans from possession as tenants at
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(Plaintiffs' Exhibit G). (Emil Jacobson's Deposition,
page 20, line 11 et seq). {R. 95-96). Daisy Jacobson's Deposition, pages 4-5-6-7). {Leona Swan's Deposition, pages
2-3).
(George Swan's Deposition, pages 5-7). We think
the court's analysis and findings insofar as they pertain to
the matter of the mutual termination of the real estate contract by the two leases is well stated in the· Memorandum Decision of February 21, 1953, and we therefore call the Court's
attention to it (R. pages 39 to 47). (R. 98-99, par. 2). We
do not agree with the lower court, of course, on the questions of penalty and the disallowance of attorney's fees.
The first lease makes it very clear that the status of
the parties was completely ·changed from that of seller and
buyer to lessor and lessee. Note the language of the lease
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit G). It uses this kind of language:
Agreement--by and between Emil J. Jacobson--herein called lessors and George W. Swan--herein called IesStees. In second paragraph the use of the word "were" indicating that they are not now purchasing but were to purchase the property, the word "were" being in the past tense.
In third paragraph - admission of default and that lessors
by right constituted the lessees their tenants at will, and
lessees acknowledge that they are at this time merely tenants at will. In fourth paragraph lessors are willing to allow lessees to remain in possession on a month to month
basis for a period not to exceed one year from date on the
terms set out in the lease. In paragraph 1 the lease is on
a month to month basis ~nding no later than April 30, 1950.
Note the use of the term rental on the amount of payments
and credit on the already accrued and past due obligation
of $889.41 under the real estate contract not paid. The
lease is specifi·c and definite in all its terms - that rent
will.
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shall be $80.00 per month and $20.00 on the accrued debt,
a total of $100.00 per month. The lease does not provide
a lump sum of rent in gross, but only from month to month.
If performance is faithfully made at the times they are d~,
lessors will make a new contract in similar form as the old
and give full credit for all payments made. The purpose of
the lease is to allow the lessees a reasonable QPportonity to
r~instate their right ~ purchase said property but at the
same time to preserve the lessors' right to remove the lessees from possession as tenants at will in the event the latter do not perform the terms of the lease. The next paragraph provides for payment of a reasonable attorneys fee
in case of default that may arise from enforcing said agreement.
The court in deciding the questions of whether or not
the two leases constituted mere extensions and modifications of the real estate contract whereby strict performance
. . . . is waived . . . . that Swans have made
substantial performance thereunder and are not therefore
in default under said contract, held against Swans on that
defense and said in part, referring to the first lease: "No
language could be clearer as to the termination as a contract between the parties of Exhibit "A". Exhibit "B" was
thus a new agreement, which constituted a month to month
contingent tenancy, with a granted right to the defendants,
upon their payment of certain amounts "at the times they
are due," to "enter into a new real estate contract with the
lessees in similar form to Exhibit "A" . . . . "It would
be imposing terms upon the parties which they had at the
time no thought of entering into to hold that "B" was a waiver of the terms of "A", or that it was an extension thereof,
It was a new agreement which adopted no tenns of the old,
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is complete and entire in itself, and refers to the old one
only for the purpose of fixing the considerations for the
new." (R. 45). The court found that Swans defaulted under said first lease in the sum of $287.41 and said first lease
expired on April 30, 1950 (R. 81, 96), and that the $287.41
was paid on June 7, 1950 (R. 81). We do not agree with
the court's finding that the amount of said default was
$287.41, and we will argue this matter under point one of
our cross appeal. There was no written agreement so far
as we can determine existing between the parties from April 30, 1950, until June 27, 1950. On June 27, 1950, the parties entered into the second lease agreement, whereby
Swans continued in possession of the premises on the terms
and conditions contained in that lease (Plaintiffs' Exhibit
H). (R. 96). This lease, the court held, was quite similar
to the first lease, and it is likewise a complete new agreement, referring to "A" and "B" only for the purpose of providing a contingent right for Swans to have a new contract
of purchase (R. 46). Swans in the second lease acknowledged that they were in default in making the payments under the real estate contract and that Jacobsons pursuant
to the right therein granted to them, constituted Swans tenants at will, and "the lessees hereby acknowledge that they
are at this time merely tenants at will." Swans also admit
that they were allowed by Jacobsons to remain in possession of said property on a month to month basis until April
.30, 1950 under the terms set forth in the first lease dated
April, 1949. Swans further admit that they failed to perform pursuant to the first lease, but that the lessors are
willing to allow the lessees to remain in possession of said
property on a month to month basis until August 31, 1950,
on payment of $300.00 by that date, and if that term is comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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plied with, then on a month to month basis for a period not
to ex~ 3 years from date on the terms and conditions set
forth in the second lease. The second lease then provides
that the lessors lease to the lessees on a month to month
basis for a period commencing June 1, 1950, and ending August 31, 1950 the said property. The lease says that if
Swans fail to pay the $300.00 on or before August 31, 1950,
they will surrender to lessors on September 1, 1950, the
possession of said property and that the~after they will
have no interest in or right to said property and that they
will have no claim or claims of any kind against the lessors
for any reason whatsoever. The lease further states that
if the $300.00 is paid when due that only in that event, the
lessors "hereby lease to the lessees on a month to month
basis for a period commencing September 1, 1950 and ending May 31, 1953" the said property. The lease then says
that in the event the lessees become ·month to month tenants
commencing September 1, 1950, as therein provided, they
agree to pay $100.00 a month on the first day of each month
during said three year period, and in addition all insurance
premiums, taxes, assessments, relating to said property
during the period of their tenancy. It is further provided
that in the event the lessess shall pay the said amounts at
the times they are due respectively, the lessors agree to enter into a new real estate sales contract with the lessees in
similar form to the one attached to the lease and give credit
for all amounts paid on t~ principal on the real estat contract, the first lease and the second lease. The lease then
sets forth the purpose of the contract as follows, "It is
agreed by and between the parties hereto that the purpose
of this contract is to allow the lessees a reasonable opportunity to reinstate their right to purchase said property
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but at the same time to preserve the lessors' right to remove the lessees from possession as tenants at will in the
e\rent the lessees do not peform according to the terms of
this contract." The lease then says that the lessees agree
to deliver up the premises at the expiration of the term in
as good order and condition as when the same were entered
upon by lessees, reasonable use and wear thereof and damage by the elements excepted, and that lesse·es will not underlet said premises, without the written consent of lessors
first obtained. The lessees agree that if the rent, or any
part thereof, shall be unpaid for 15 days after the same shall
become due, or if default be made in any of the covenants
therein contained to be kept by the lessees . . . ., it
shall and may be lawful for lessors . . . . without notice or legal process, to re-enter and take possession of said
premises and relet the same and apply the net proceeds so
received upon the amount due under this lease. The lessees agree to pay all ·water rates, plumbing bills, gas and
electric light charges, and each agrees to pay costs and reasonable attorneys fees that may arise from enforcing said
agreement. The provisions were made binding upon the
heirs, personal representatives and assigns of the parties.
The intention of the parties, we think, is important in
construing the three agreements. Daisy Jacobson, on page
2 of her deposition, said that when they bought the property they didn't buy it to live in or to rent, but to secure
the payment of the money they had invested in the property. She further stated that it was her understanding that
when the leases were made, the Jacobsons could not force
Swans to abide by the terms of the original real estate contract. That the extent of Swans liability as reflected in the
leases was only that Swans would lease the property from
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Jacobsons for the period of time designated in the leases;
that if Swans did perform those leases and keep up their
rent that they would have the right to have a new contract
made for the purchase of the property. But that Jacobsons
could not force Swans to enter into a new contract if they
didn't want to, and that if Swans violated the leases that
Jacobsons were to have possession of the property free from
all rights of Swans therein and thereto, and Swans were to
vacate the premises and let Jacobsons have the property
and the real estate contract was cancelled and the property
leased to Swans. (Daisy Jacobson's Deposition, pages 4 to
8). Mrs. Leona Swan, in her deposition, on pages 2 and 3,
said that she signed the real estate contract and the two
leases and understood them; that she had known that the
delinquency existed in respect to this matter ever since
Swans made the contract, and so in order to defi¥ their
rights after the original contract was breached, they entered into the first lease and later the second lease.
Emil Jacobson in his deposition, on page 20, testified
that in April, 1949, Swans were delinquent $889.41; that
the first lease was prepared in April, 1949; that the matter
was discussed by Mr. Jacobson and Mr. Swan and Attorney
Clyde Sandgren; that at that time it was agreed that the
contract of sale of real estate was to be terminated, and this
lease substituted in its place; that if the lease were performed according to its terms then Swans would have the
right to enter into another new contract with Jacobsons for
the purchase of the property as indicated in Exhibit B.
On pages 21 to 24 of Jacobson's deposition, he testified
that Swans defaulted in the performance of the first lease;
that in April, 1950, the parties agreed to go into another
tenant at will lease or contract on a monthly basis; that the
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lease was executed on June 27, 1950; that it was agreed at
that time that any interest in the real estate contract, of
cow-se, was cancelled, and that if the second lease was performed according to its terms, that Swans would then have
a right to enter into a new contract with Jacobsons; that
Jacobson was instructed that it was a tenant at will lease,
on a month to month basis; that was the way it was explained to him; that Mr. Sandgren, his attorney, prepared
both leases, and it was Jacobson's understanding that if
Swans violated the terms of this lease that then they were
to become tenants at will and were to vacate the premises
and Jacobsons were to have the right to the property free
and clear of whatever contract of sale of real estate which
is referred to as Exhibit A in the Complaint; that Swans
defaulted in the performance of the second lease as follows:
November 1, 1950, the installment of $100.00; January 1,
1951--$100.00; January 1, 1952--$100.00; and from March,
1952, until December inclusive it amounts to about $1000.00
of unpaid payments-a total delinquency of unpaid payments as of December 1, 1952, of $1,300.00. In addition,
$311.58 for 1950-51-52 taxes, and $78.00 fire insurance premiums, and $9.50 water assessment, all of which Swans
agreed to pay under the second lease. That in addition
Jacobson has paid his attorney, Clyde Sandgren, $204.40
as attorney's fees, in connection with the enforcement of
the lease, and that Swans have defaulted in all of the agreements, having been continuously in default for the past
twenty months; and that Swans have never been up to date
with their contracts.
Mr. Swan, on pages 4 to 12 of his deposition, testified
that he executed the real estate contract; that he didn't
keep up the payments as provided in said contract; that he
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got behind approximately $889.00; that he executed the
first lease in Clyde Sandgren's office; that he executed the
!-'et'ond lease; that when the first lease e~ired Swans were
delinquent in the paymentof rent provided for in that lease;
that he paid the $300.00 to be paid under the second lease
before August 31, 1950; that he became delinquent in the
payment of the rent under the second lease in February,
1952; that he has not made any payments on rent since February, 1952. That he offered to pay the payments to Jacobsons through Attorney Sandgren in March, 1952. That
J acobsons were not present, but Sandgren called them on
the phone; that he took four hundred and some dollars that
covered $200.00 delinquent taxes, $100.00 monthly payment,
$78.00 insurance and $9.00 water bill; that he tendered it
to Clyde Sandgren. He had the cash with him. Sandgren
wouldn't accept it. Sandgren called Jacobson on the phone
and Jacobson he supposed would not accept it; this was the
day after he got a notice to quit; that he has made several
approaches since then to have it refinanced and pay it off,
but they couldn't agree on the amount owing. Swan then
testified as follows: Q. "Well, did you make any offer to
pay the rent after March, 1952?" A. "Well, we made an
offer to pay off the entire contract, inasmuch as we had
failed the first time we supposed Mr. Jacobson no longer
wished that sort of thing, so we tried to take over the entire
contract and reimburse Mr. Jacobson for all that was owing him, but we couldn't come to a decision as to the right
amount for it" (George Swan's Deposition, page 10). Appellants, on page 8 of their brief, say, "Of course, nothing
further was paid . . . ." Why not?
Swan then testified that he tried to get a loan from
Clair Mortenson, but only for $8,400.00, in October, 1952.·
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That he tried the First Security Bank, but the loan was
turned down in April, 1952 (Swan's Deposition, pages 12,
16). That Tom Stubbs offered to take over the delinquency
in the contract and reimburse them at the rate of $200.00
a month. That their offer was made through Clyde Sandgren, by Ray !vie, Swan's attorney. That he was not present, so he doesn't know whether there was a tender of any
money. Swan then testified, on page 13 of his deposition,
as follows: Q. "Now do you know of any other offers to
pay this rent or to pay off the entire contract as you call
it?" A. "No I don't think there were. We had several in
the making, and I believe they were the only ones that
were."
Swan then testified, on page 13 of his deposition, that
he was served with three Notices to Quit- one in March,
1949, one in March, 1952, and one in August, 1952.
In concluding the matter as to the ability of Mr. Swan
to raise the amounts actually due Mr. Jacobson, Mr. Swan
was asked if he could raise enough money to pay the
amounts set out on page 19 of Swan's deposition - and his
reply was that he had never received any commitment that
he could borrow that amount of money on this property and
pay Mr. Jacobson off if he were willing to accept it.
Mrs. Swan testified, on pages 3 and 4 of her deposition,
that they had talked about trying to negotiate a loan to
pay Mr. Jacobson off -if he were willing to accept it, but that
they haven't yet received anything definite as to an amount,
so far as she knew.
Emil Jacobson testified on pages 15 and 16 of his deposition that he was never told by Attorney Sandgren or Attorney Morgan that Swans were willing to go ahead and pay
on the contract. That what Swans were doing was just a
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stall, which it turned out to be. No offer was made to either
pay up the delinquent rent or pay off the contract. On pages
25 to 27 of Mr. Jacobson's deposition he testifies that as of
December 23, 1952, the date of his deposition, he had never
been tendered any money in connection with paying up on
the second lease or the original real estate contract. That
the First Security Bank had turned Swan's application for
a loan down because of Swan's credit rating, through judgments and other ratings, wasn't good and they wouldn't loan
enough. That Clair Mortenson told Jacobson he would not
make the loan and turned it down. That other institutions
contacted appraised the property at $10,000.00 or $11,000.00..
The court in its Memorandum Decision (R. 28) found
against the defendants on the right to rescind the agreements "A'', "B" and "C", and held that the Notice to Quit
served on August 12, 1952, was good (R. 19-20).
The court, on the basis of the ruling in Perkins vs.
Spencer, case 263 P. 2-446, held that the question of penalty
in this case should be determined; and also the matter of
whether plaintiffs' attorneys are entitled to any attorneys'
fees, and if so, how much. The court then reserved issues
of fact to be submitted to a jury and an issue of law as statted in appellants brief, page 11 (R. 49-50. The court awarded plaintiffs immediate restitution of the premises, and restrained plaintiffs from selling or encumbering the premises
unless a bond was filed to secure payment of any sums that
may be adjudged in favor of defendants upon hearing of
the reserved issues. The court ordered that plaintiffs may
prepare and present Findings, Conclusions and interlocutory
decree, subject to restraint or bond and that plaintiffs may
have a writ restoring plaintiffs to full possession of the
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premises. The court further ordered that the parties have
10 days in which to enter any objections or proposals they
may have in respect to the statement of issues reserved (R.
49-50). Objections and proposals and motion to hear the
matter without a jury were filed by plaintiffs and argued
on March 13, 1953 and all denied (R. 69). No bond was
filed and no interlocutory papers filed, as the case came on
for trial before the jury on March 16, 1953 (R 73). The
court's Memorandum Decision was made February 21st,
1953, and the respective counsel were given copies thereof.
We can see no harm to anyone if no interlocutory papers
were prepared and filed, inasmuch as the case was about
to be tried in a few days.
The jury returned its special verdict, finding that under the real estate contract of June 27, 1947, Swan had paid
$5,060.00, which included the $4,000.00 paid to P. K. Nielson. That under the first lease of April, 1949, Swan had
paid $1727.41, and under the second lease of June 27, 1950,
Swan paid $1,900.00, the total being $8687.41, over a period
of about six y~rs. The jury found no damages to the premises, $14,000.00 to be the value of the property when sold
to Swans and on September 15, 1952, and found $85.00 per
month to be the reasonable rental value of the premises during period of occupancy by Swans, and $500.00 as a reasonable attorney's fee (R. 63-64). The court adopted the
findings of the jury and gave judgment in favor of the appellants in the sum of $331.30, stating in its analysis that
inasmuch as the court has found in its Memorandum Decision that the lease, Exhibit "B", completely terminated
Exhibit "A", excepting for the purpose of fixing the price
and terms of a new agreement of purchase, the court finds
and holds that the penalty or liquidated damages, as urged
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by the defendants, must be determined in respect to the
Uniform Real Estate Contract, Exhibit "A", and in view of
the decision in Perkins vs. Spencer, the court must and does
hold the paymentB made under Exhibit "A" to be a penaity,
and that there was a total of $3,190.00 which constituted
su~ h penalty (R. 80) . The court set off delinquencies under
the second lease of $1,328.70 (R. 82-83, 97, 99-100). Also
$1,530.00 treble damages, leaving a net judgment of $331.30
to appellants (R. 83 and 100, 101, 105-6). The court also
denied plaintiffs' attorneys fees (R. 84, 100), but found
$500.00 to be a reasonable attorneys fee (R. 97). The court
held the Notice to Quit good (R. 86, 97, 100-101). The
court found that at no time since March 5, 1952, have the
defendants offered to the plaintiffs payment of all sums due
the plaintiffs at that time or since the schedule of payments
set forth in Exhibits "A", "B", and "C", nor have the defendants offered to refinance the purchase of the property
for the full amount due the plaintiffs since then (R. 44, 98).
The court found that plaintiffs performed all the terms of
said agreements on their part to be performed (R. 98). See
Mr. Swan's Deposition, page 16, where he admits it. In the
Conclusions of Law (R. 98-101) the court concluded that
the real estate contract is not a mortgage. Swans have
abandoned this theory (page 9 of appellants' brief. That
the relationship of vendor-purchaser under the real estate
contract was mutually terminated by agreements of the
parties, said agreements being the two leases. That from
April, 1949, to April 30, 1950, Swans were tenants at will
of Jacobsons. That the first lease expired April 30, 1950.
That Swans were tenants at will of Jacobsons under the
second lease until September 15, 1952, and thereafter until March 15, 1952 Swans held the premises unlawfully and
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were guilty of unlawful detainer for that period of time.
The court then concludes that the amount of $5060.00 which
includes the $4000.00 paid Nielson, paid on the real estate
contract, less the reasonable rental value for the same at
$85.00 a month, amounting to $1870.00, constitutes a penalty, which penalty is unenforceable, and gives Swans a
gross credit of $3190.00. The court then concludes that
J acobsons are entitled to set off the delinquencies accrued
under the second lease and interest on these delinquencies,
all amounting to $1328.70, and that $1530.00 should be set
off as damages for unlawful detainer from September 15,
1952, to March 15, 1953 at $85.00 per month trebled. That
$331.30 is the net penalty and the defendants are entitled
to judgment for that sum. The court then concluded that
this action is not brought to enforce Exhibits "A", "B", or
"C" to the Complaint, and that therefore Jacobsons are not
entitled to any judgment for attorneys fees. The court then
concludes that Jacobsons are entitled to quiet their title and
restitution of the premises. Judgment was entered accordingly (R. 105-6) .
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON CROSS-APPEAL

Jacobsons have cross appealed, and assign the following cross errors (R. 115, 117). (We shall join Points 1 and
3 (R. 117) under Point One herein).
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE
IS A PENALTY IN THIS CASE ARISING OUT OF EXHIIBITS "A", "B", AND "C" ATTACHED TO THE COMPLAINT, OR EITHER OF THEM, AND IN_ UIMITING
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THE AMOUNT OF RECOVERY OF THE PLAINTIFFS,
AND IN AWARDING DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT
AGAINST PLAINTI~FS FOR THE SUM OF $331.30 TOGE:rHER WITH INTEREST, BECAUSE THE COURT
HELD, AND RIGHrLY SO, THAT EXHIBIT "A" WAS
MUTUALLY TERMINATED BY AGREEMENTS OF THE
PARTIES, EXHIBITS "B" AND "C", AND THEREBY
THEY MUTUALLY RELEASED AND DISCHARGED
EACH OTHER FROM ALL OBLIGATIONS ARISING OR
GROWING OUT OF EXHIBIT "A", BY EXECUTING
EXHBITS "B" AND "C'', ANlD BY THEREBY ESTABLISHING THE RELATIONSIITP OF LESSORS AND LESSEES, THE LESSEES BECOl\ITNG TENANTS AT WilL
AND THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN NO OFFSET, BY
USING ANY AMOUNTS PAID ON EXlllBIT "A" BY
SWANS AGAINST THE AMOUNT PLAINTIFF WAS
ENTITLED TO RECOVER.
POINT TWO

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
TinS ACTION IS NOT BRO.UGHT TO ENFORCE EITHER
EXIllBITS ''A'', ''B'', OR ''C'', AND THAT PLAJNri'IFFS
ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ANY JUDGMENT WHATSOEVER FOR A'ITORNEYS FEES.
ARGUMENT

We shall first discuss the four points which appellants
designate in their brief as the basis for their claim that the
case should be remanded only for the purpose of detennining the amount of appellants' damages for wrongful termination of the contract. (See Appellants' Brief, page 34).
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peal. At this point we desire to make a few comments
\vhich we think ought to be mentioned.
The appellants, under Point Four in their brief, on
pages 15 and 29-31, say the court erred in finding that appellants were, at the time of entry of judgment, still detaining the premises unlawfully or detaining them at all. This
assignment of error we think grows out of Finding of Fact
No. 15 (R. 97). There is no dispute that Swans surrendered
possession of the premises on ·April 11, 1953 (R. 104). (R.
121-122). It is true that the Findings of the court were
signed on June 11, 1953, but it is also true that the trial of
the case was concluded on March 18, 1953 (R. 75). And
counsel argued the case on March 24, 1953 (R. 76), and that
in paragraph 4 (R. 95) in the same Findings of Fact the
court finds that the defendants entered into possession of the
premises on June 27, 1947, and remained in possession
thereof continuously until March 15, 1953. i Obviously the
court didn't intend to, and did not say that defendants were
detaining the premises past the date of March 15, 1953.
Ho\v could it, when the evidence was all in when the case
was concluded in March? If it were intended that the court
should go beyond March 15-then it should have gone
to the date of Apri111, but it could not do that because that
eviden·ce was not before it when the case was taken under
advisement. Plaintiffs are entitled to almost another month
of treble damages to April11, but that has not been includede in this judgment. We think that Point Four has no
merit.
Swans do not want the property. They want to compel Jacobsons to buy the property back and refund to them
all amounts paid above the reasonable rental value. They
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ing the keys over to Jacobsons (R. 104, 121-122). They
voluntarily surrendered their lease, if there was a term lease
as they contend, the same day. They are not asking the
court to reinstate any of the agreements nor reinstate them
either as purchasers or as lessees under any of the agreements. They have filed no supersedeas ~bond on appeal, to
stay the execution of the judgment. They gave up the property before the Judgment and Decree were enterd on June
11, 1953 ( R. 105-6) . They are not asking any relief except
damages for wrongful termination of the contract. They
concede that Jacobsons are entitled to reasonable rent of
$85.00 a month, in their brief, page 31. The only basis of
damage if there were a wrongful termination would be the
treble damage, but there was no pleading on damages for
wrongful termination, and it was not until after all the evidence was in and the case was argued to the court that the
issue of damages was suggested by defendants, and defendants' counsel asked for permission on March 24, 1953, to file
an amendment to the affirmative defense in the Answer,
which amendment was to contain a Counterclaim for damages for breach of contract - the second lease. The court
denied the motion (R. 76). They abandoned the mortgage
theory, as further evidence of abandonment of the property.
The two leases show also that what Swans wanted was merely an option to buy the property back without binding them
to buy it back. Swan could have, and we think he has, and
has had, reasons why he only wanted to be a lessee of the
premises with an option to buy. In considering Points One,
Two, and Three of appellants, we think that appellants have
little or no merit in these points, as they failed to apply for
relief under Section 78-36-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
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leged right to have a new purchase agreement. Appellants
have argued throughout their brief that they had a lease
for a definite term and that it ran until May, 1953, and yet
they failed to apply for relief under that section to preserve
the balance of that term. Having failed to apply for that
relief, we submit they have waived it. Conunercial Block
Realty Company vs. Merchants Protective Association, 71
Utah 505; 267 P. 1009. If the leases were extensions or
modifications of the real estate contract, and if the Notices
to Quit were not proper, and if the tender of sums due was
made on March 5, 1952 and thereafter, then why didn't appellants ask for relief under 78-36-10, 1953 U. C. A., and
get a stay of execution of the judgment, or pay the judgment and be restored to their estate? I,f on the other hand,
our theory that they were merely tenants at will and that
there was a mutual termination of the real estate contract
is correct, then the leases were not extensions or modifications of the original contract, and the Notices to Quit were
proper, and the tender of the payments of the amounts due
on the contracts A, B, and C was ineffectual, as there was
no real estate contract in existence and the tender, if any
was ever made for the right amount on the second lease,
nor was any tender, kept alive. We also submit that there
was a waiver of any penalty under "A" by the conduct of
the parties_ in making the two leases and under the testimony and evidence in the case.
ANSWER TO POINT ONE

THE TRIA·L CO·URT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
TH!AT THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT O·F
JUNE 27, 1947, WAS TERMINATED BY THE LEASES OF
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APRIL, 1949, AND OF JUNE 27, 1950. THESE INSTRJUMENTS WERE NOT IN TRUTH AND FACT :MERELY EXTENSIONS AND MODOFICATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF
JUNE 27, 1947, THAT CONTRACT WAS PROPERLY
AND LAWFULLY TERMINATED, AND THE TRIAL
COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED THE DEFENDANTS (LESSEES) RELIEF FROM ·A :FORFErruRE OF
SUMS PAID THEREUNDER.
Respondents contend that his Court should not construe
the two leases as extensions and modifications of the contract of sale, because there is nothing in the record before
the Court to show that they were in truth or in fact other
than what they purport to be on their face. The Memorandum Decision (R. 39-42, 44-45) states the intentions of the
parties; the leases themselves recite the purpose and meaning of the agreements (R. 14-17); and the depositions of all
four of the parties state they read and understood the documents. (George Swan's Deposition, P. 5-6 and 16). (Leona Swan's Deposition, P. 3). Daisy Jacobson's Deposition,
P. 4-8). Emil Jacobson's Deposition, P. 16). Appellants
have carried no burden of proof required to establish by
clear and convincing proof that the relationship was other
than or different from the provisions upon the face of the
written instruments executed by the parties. Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2nd 940; Brown v. Skeen, 89 Utah
568, 58 P. 2nd 24.
Respondents did not agree to sell the property to appellants in any event by executing the lease agreements.
The faithful performance of the lease agreement was made
a condition precedent to the entering of a new contract of
sale. The sale, then, was to follow the leases and therefore
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was not embodied as any part of the lease agreements.
There was no fraud in entering into these lease agreements,
and there is nothing against public policy in entering into
them. The leases were inconsistent with the contract of
sale by providing for a rental to ·be paid in cash every month
for the use and possession of the premises with the proviso
that if the payments and taxes were not paid ·at the times
they were due that the lessors could remove the lessees as
tenants at will. The lessees had acknowledged that they
were properly constituted as tenants at will under the contract of sale and were at the time of entering into the lease
agreements merely tenants at will. Lessees acknowledged
as well their default of the contract of sale. Any question
as to proper notice to lessees to terminate their rights under
the contract of sale would be waived by these acknowledgements and the making of the leases. The case of Pacific
Development Co. v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 P. 2nd 748,
cited on P. 5 of appellants' brief, requiring alternative notice
if seller by his conduct or words waived strict performance
of the contract, would therefore not apply. The first lease
says that if the payment of the rents, taxes, insurance, and
assessments and the $889.41 delinquency under the contract
of sale be paid at the times they are due as provided, for a
certain length of time, on a month to month basis, then lessors agree to enter into a new real estate contract giving
credit on the principal for all amounts paid.
In comparing these agreements with the contract of
sale, it will be seen that under the leases, specific perfonnance of the sale of the property is lost to the lessors. The
lessees do not have to buy the property and would have a
perfect defense to lessor's suit for specific performance by
saying, "We have defaulted under the contract of sale and
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gave up our payments as liquidated damages, and we are
now merely leasing the property with an option to enter
into a new contract if we continue with our lease. Even if
we perform the lease, we do not have to enter into a new
contract of sale. We did not agree to enter into a new contract; the lessors agreeed to enter into a new contract with
us if we so desired. The lease is to be construed in our favor
and strictly against the lessors."
What if the property had rapidly depreciated or the
house destroyed by fire? Respondents would be unable to
enforce the sale against the lessees. If lessees are, under
the lease agreements, in truth, vendees entitled to credit on
the contract for everything theretofore paid, then lessees
have gained powerful prerogatives as a result of their breach
of contract in the first instance.
Appellants in their brief, on P. 23, submit that the socalled leases were intended at the time they were drafted
as a transparent attempt to avoid the Perkins v. Spencer rule
of damages. That case was decided in April, 1952, and
these leases were drafted in 1949 and 1950. The parties inthe case at bar thought that the forfeiture as liquidated
damages as provided in the contract of sale was legitimate
procedure. Appellants now contend that by entering into
lease agreements, the lessors were plotting how to keep the
liquidated damages in future years, instead of recognizing
the leniency of respondents in allowing the appellants an
opportunity to reinstate their contract with full credit by
in effect recognizing the harshness of the forfeiture and applying equitable relief voluntarily.
The true intention of the parties was to enter into a
lease with an option to reinstate the original contract. The
option was self-executing, but it did not mature unless the
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leases were complied with in full and for the duration thereof. The puvpose clause in the leases themselves clearly defines the intent of the parties. Appellants were to get a new
contract only if they performed the leases faithfully; there
was no assurance that title, legal or equitable, was to pass
until the parties decided what they wanted to do and come
to a meeting of the minds upon the completion of the lease
agreements. The rents had to be paid whether a contract
of sale was to mature or not, and whether Swan wanted to
buy or not.
It is true that lessors could not dispossess lessees as
long as lessees were not in default. The tenancy was on a
month to month basis not to exceed one year and three years
in the respective leases. But it was the option that prevented lessors from terminating the estate of lessees and not
the incidents of the estate. By the provisions in the leases
themselves the lessees contracted and agreed to be removed
as tenants at will ln the event payments were not made
according to the terms of the lease agreements. This provision is not at all in conflict with the purpose and incidents
of the lease, nor is it in conflict with a tenancy for a term
if one existed. This will be discussed under Answer to Point
Two. But the term in this instance was included to fix a
time for the option to mature.
The leases here involved fit well into the discussion of
rights and duties pertaining to a lease with option to purchase as found in Tilton v. Sterling Coal and Coke Co., 28
Utah 1 ~3, 77 P. 758.
"When an option is given to a lessee to purchase
the leased premises, the lease is a sufficient consideration to support the option, and the lessor cannot withdraw it before the time given in which to accept it has
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expired; but when the time for its acceptance is specified, the option, as a general rule, unless it is accepted
at that time, terminates, if no further time be granted.
While an option to purchase, if based upon a sufficient
consideration, binds the party granting it, it is not a
contract of purchase, but simply a contract granting
to the holder of the option the privilege of purchasing,
and binds the party by whom it is given to sell and convey the property involved, upon the acceptance of the
option in accordance with the terms, and the compliance on the part of the acceptor with its requirements.
There is no contract of purchase, or any obligation to
sell and convey until the option is accepted and porformed, or tender of performance by the holder is made
in proper time. Until then there is no contract between
the parties which can be specifically enforced."
See 55 Am. Jur., page 492, Vendor and Purchaser, under Options, par. 27-31, 39, 40, 43. See 32 Am. Jur., pages
278-288, Landlord and Tenant, under Option to Purchase,
paragraphs 299, 300, 301, 302, 305, 308-310, wherein it
states that the optionee does not become a vendee until the
option is exercised, and where a failure to pay rent under
the lease constitutes a failure of consideration for the option, and where service of notice to quit by lessor for breach
of the lease terminates the tenant's option to purchase.
"The fact that if a sale of the land afterward follows the option, the payment or consideration for the
option is to be applied as a part of the price of the land,
does not render it insufficient to support the option."
Kingsley v. Kressly, 60 Or. 167, 118 P. 678. This was
a case where optionees allowed to go Into possession as long
as they performed under the option. A failure to pay the
first installment operated as a surrender of their possession.
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The court's analysis (R. 81) calls the lease agreements an option to reinstate the real estate sales contract.
An option is a unilateral contract acceptable at the discretion of the optionee. The remedy of specific performance
is available on acceptance by optionee on the theory that
the option ripened into a mutually binding and mutually enforceable contract. 49 Am. Jur., page 137, Specific Peffonnance, paragraphs 117-120.
"Under lease with option to purchase, relation of
parties is that of landlord and tenant until option is exercised, and then option does not relate back to date
of lease unless lease specifies that rentals paid shall apply on purchase price, and if option is not exercised,
payments remain as rentals." Powell v. Hlammon Consol. Gold Fields, 8 Alaska, 153.
"A lease with option to purchase, if tenant pays
all rents and taxes, etc., is legal and binding on parties.
Said agreement providing that it should be void, and
that option should not exist, if second party defaulted
in performance thereof, was a lease with option to purchase rather than a "mortgage" and, after defaulting,
second party bad no right to purchase by tendering
purchase price and amount of rent in arrears. Bishop
v. Melton, 202 Ark. 732, 152 SW 2nd 299, ·Gwaltney v.
Pioneer Trust Co., 1948 Oreg., 199 P. 2nd 250.
Appellants ,cite the case of Lori, Limited, Inc. et al v.
Wolfe et al, 192 P. 2nd 112, 85 Cal. App. 2nd 54, in which
the lessor seeks to apply retroactively a gross revenue rental covenant where the covenant was silent as to its applying retroactively or not. Court held the lease to be construed against the lessor and in favor of the lessee when uncertainty exists. But in the case at bar it is the lessee-appellants who contend the lease is something different than it
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purports to be, namely, that the lease is not a lease but rather a contract of sale. This is not the sort of case where
the construction is construed strictly against the lessor.
Leases must be given interpretation which will make
them effective in conformity with the intention of the parties as to the whole lease. Clauses must be given the construction which will be most favorable to the party in whose
favor they are made, and lessees will be bound with the interpretation they understood the lessors to understand it
at the time of making it. Every clause and word must be
given the effect and meaning which is harmonious with the
actual purpose and intention of the parties. Pappadatos v.
Mkt. St. Bldg. Corp., 130 Cal. App. 62, 19 P. 2nd 517; Eggen
v. Wetterborg, 193 Oreg. 145, 237 P. 2nd 970; I. X. L. Furniture House v. Berets, 32 Utah 454, 91 P. 279.
Appellants in their Answer admit that they entered into
negotiations with Attorney Clyde D. Sandgren to execute
the lease agreements (R. 22). Twice they admitted they
were tenants at will and in default under the lease agreements (R. 14, 16). The lessees have acceded to the construction given the leases by the lessors in constituting them
as tenants at will by a five-day notice to quirt as tenants at
will (Defendants' Exhibit 5). The construtcion given by
the parties to the contract should prevail. Tilton v. Sterling Coal and Coke Co., supra.
Even if this tenancy were a term tenancy, as contended
by appellants, surely parties can contract as to the means
of notice necessary to terminate the tenancy and effect their
removal. Notice necessary to terminate is nearly ·always
spelled out in a term lease. Parties may waive by agreement, compliance with statutes regarding notice. Devonshire v. Langstaff, 10 Cal. App. 2nd 369, 51 P. 2nd 902.
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The court was right in holding that the contract was
clear and explicit as to how appellants were to be removed
from the premises in event of their default. The intent and
purpose of the leases could not be clearer started as to the
respective rights of the parties thereto than does the 4th
paragraph of the second lease (R. 46-47). Even if the lessees were not technically tenants at will, the right of lessors
was expressly reserved that the lessees in event of their default may be removed as tenants at will. Even assuming
that the tenancy of the leases is in fact a term tenancy, it is
modified and limited by the tenant at will provision.
Appellants admit that their option to purchase was
most valuable in view of sums already paid (!Defendants'
Brief, P. 24) but question the wisdom of the bargain on P.
18, by stating the consideration for the "bargain" was excessive. The parties all stated they signed and understood
the lease agreements, and all but Mr. Swan said they understood their rights to be defined in the lease agreements
(Depositions quoted supra). The appellants certainly did
not demand a penalty rebate when the first contract was
terminated, but were willing to make their rights in in an
agreement that preserved to them all their interests, if any,
they had accrued, with an opportunity to reinstate their full
rights as under the breached contract by entering into a
new contract with full ;credit on the principal of all amounts
they had or were to pay. Appellants found nothing inequitable in their lease agreement, and if they chose to default
under it they have waived any ·penalty they might have suffered before entering into the new contract agreements. 12
Am. Jur., page 983, Contracts, paragraphs 405-417. The
court was correct in determining that the parties by mutual
agree·ment terminated the uniform real estate ·contract (R.
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98-99). The first and second lease agreements were new
and inconsistent contracts with the real estate contract. Appellants became tenants rather than vendees, with an option to reinstate their rights with a new contract by performing the leases and again becoming vendees.
Defendants' brief, on P. 22, states that the only difference in point of law of the positions of the parties under the
real estate contract and the leases was in the amounts to
be paid per month. The uniform real estate contract was
greater than and included the elements of a lease like the
ones under examination. This being true, the lease would
be expected to find counter-parts of nearly all its terms in
a real estate sales contract. But a closer inspection will disclose many provisions in the real estate contract that are
not found in the leases at all. The status of the parties is
greatly changed as a matter of law, however, in that the
vendors under the contract had an option to specifically enforce the sale of the property, sue for accruals, sue for damages for breach of contract, forfeit payments of buyer and
dispossess the vendees upon their 'breach thereof. Under
the leases lessors could not specifically enforce the sale of
the property, ·could not sue for accruals, except for time of
lease if the lessees remained in possession, could not sue for
damages for breach of contract, except for amounts accrued
under lease, and could not forfeit the payments of buyer
because the payments were rents to pay for possession of
the lessees of the premises. Vendees under the contract had
an obligation to buy premises, while under the leases the
lessees had a personal option to buy, but yere not under an
obligation to buy. The leases then yet had to ripen into a
buyer and seller arrangement. Lessors were willing to allow lessees to remain in possession for rents on certain ·proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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visions. It seems that appellants are continually declaring
they have something different from what the agreements
say they have. First they said they were mortgagors with
an equity of redemption under the Uniform Real Estate Contract (R. 23), and now they contend they are purchasers
rather than lessees under the lease agreements. They also
contend that even though lessees agreed to be removed as
tenants at will if they default under the leases, that they
can default under the leases and not be removed as tenants
at will, because they are instead term tenants (Appellants'
Brief; P. 21). The stated length of the term was for the
purpose of fixing a period for the performance of the lease
to base the exercising of the option upon. Notice the language - month to· month basis for a period not to exceed
one year (or 3 years) as the case may be (R. 14, 16). Also
there is no agreement to pay a gross amount of rent under
the lease that appellants promised to pay. The case of Andrews v. Russell, 259 P. 113, 85 Cal. App. 149, is cited by
appellants on P. 20 of their brief as authority that statutes
on tenancies at ·will are held not applicable to leases for definite periods, though terminable if covenants therein are not
fulfilled. That was a case to quiet title on a tenn lease that
had terminated by its own terms. Defendant in the case
said the plaintiff must serve him with Notice to Quit, as
provided by the tenant at will statute. Held: because the
tenn lease had terminated before the action brought the
statutes did not ~apply. In the case at bar the lease provides
that if covenants are not fulfilled the tenants may be removed as tenants at will. Surely appellants do not contend
that where the lease for a term provides that upon default
the lessees may be removed as tenants at will, that the statutes on tenant at will do not apply. What appellants probSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ably 1nean to say is that where they have a term tenancy
they cannot become tenants at will. That is incorrect; they
contracted to be removed as tenants at will in the event they
did not perform the terms of the contract. The contract
even provided that lessors could re-enter and re-let the premises without notice or legal process to protect the use of the
premises in the event of default by lessees. The clause making the agreement binding on the heirs, executors, administra tors and assigns of the respective parties is to provide
for the exercising of the option agreement in the event of
the death of one of the parties. 55 Ami Jur., page 513,
paragraph 42.
Any lease agreement should have the enumerated provisions on ·P. 20-21 of appellants' brief. On pages 17-18 of
their brief, appellants contend that they never were in default under any of the agreements by virtue of the fact that
the net amount of penalty that the court allowed as an offset against the amounts due under the leases was in excess
of what they owed respondents. This is a dangerous concept under the facts of this case, b~ause none of the parties would be able to know if their contracts were in force
or in default until a jury determination (as in this case)
fixed the amounts of payments and rent, etc., in order to
figure the net penalty. In addition, the payments of rent
under the lease agreements were further payments required
to be paid in cash as they became due. This is another evidence that the leases were separate and inconsistent with
the mutually terminated real estate sales contract. At no
time before, during, or after the trial were the credits on
this net penalty tendered or offered in payment of the lease
installments. The determination of the penalty is one of
damages and not of perfor,nance of the contract of sale, nor
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of subsequent agreements, and therefore is not applicable
to reinstating or enforcement of the subsequent lease agreements. Appellants do not now ask reinstatement of any of
the contracts. Their prayer is merely for damages.
In effect, the appellants are contending that this net
penalty sum is an advance payment of the rents. Brooks
v. Coppedge, Idaho 1951, 228 P. 2nd 248, is a case much in
point with the case at bar, in which there is an exhaustive
examination of the authorities on this question. The term
lease was breached in that case by a non-payment of rent,
and the lease provided that the advanced fund was to be
returned in the event the option to purchase was exercised.
Held: the fund was not returnable nor applicable to defaulted payments where lessee breaches such that the option
to purchase was never exercised, even where the lease made
no provision as to what was to be done with the advanced
sum in the event of a breach.
In the ·case at ·bar there was no contemplation that this
"phantom penalty" was to pay future installments under the
leases and save lessees from default. It was provided, however, that if the option to purchase were exercised, that all
amounts theretofore paid by lessees would be credited on
the principal of a new contract of sale, to be entered into
at the option of the lessees. Appellants also declare that
if the net penalty were applied to payments due under the
second lease, there would remain $31.30 due appellants (Appellants' brief, P. 18). This is untrue, because in figuring
the penalty, the court did not include 1952 taxes, which under the lease, the appellants would have been required to
pay (R. 82, 83).
under the Kansas case cited on P. 23 of appellants'
brief, the relationship of the parties was far different from
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the one in the case at bar. The "option" agreement in the
case cited was an option to rent or to buy, that was specifically set out in a Kansas statute, which also allowed a
six month redemption period. In the case at bar, the option to buy was a specific arrangement to mature at a specific time, not upon payment of the purchase price but upon
payment of specific amounts at specific times. The lease
was a rental agreement, and the rental was to apply on the
purchase price only if the specific option were exercised.
Equitable conversion ·could not occur unless the option were
exercised by appellants. The Kan·sas transaction is primarily a sale, and the payments are to be considered rent only
upon the default of the buyer. In the case at bar the position and intention of the parties are exactly the reversethe payments are rents required by the lease and are to be
considered to apply on the purchase only upon the performance of the buyer. The courts can save a buyer from the
effects of a minor default, but they will not specifically enforce a performance of the buyer to save him from refault.
The appellants are raising these equitable principles now
only to show damages, and not to obtain the object of the
equitable rules, namely, a conveyance of title to the property involved. Appellants pray only for damages, and have
surrendered the premises before judgment and before the
so-called term of the lease expired (R. 104, 122, 106) and
have not posted a supersedeas bond.
A penalty amount should be returned to appellants under the Perkins v. Spencer doctrine, Utah (1952), 243 P.
2nd 446, only upon a determination that they are entitled
to equitable relief from an unconscionable retention of forfeited damages by respondents. It should be obvious that
appellants have been in a position to protect their equity
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under any and all of the agreements and dealings of the parties. By entering into the lease agreements appellants
waived any claim they may have had against an unconscionable advantage taken by respondents. In other words, the
penalty, if any existed, was waived. If the money was regarded as given in consideration of the covenants in the
lease, the title to the money passed to the lessor. Curtis
v. Arnold,. 43 Cal. App. 97, 184 P. 510; Thompson v. Swiryn,
95 Cal. App. 2nd 619, 213 P. 2nd 740. Appellants made the
lease agreements with their eyes open, and not under any
fraud, duress, nor against public policy (R. 40-42, 46-47) .
.AJppellants have admittedly been in default under all
their contracts (R. 14, 16, 21, 30-31, 95-97). It has been a
habit and a custom for them to be continually in default
under all the agreements for nearly six years (Defendants'
Exhibits 1 and 2, Emil Jacobson's Deposition, P. 24). To
have enforced strict performance of the agreements, the respondents would have had to serve a notice to quit on the
appellants nearly every single month of the whole period.
He who seeks equity must do equity. Equity will not relieve against a forfeiture where the party in default for nonpayment of rent has been negligent (grossly) , or has gone
into default deliberately or inexcusably, or where non-payment has ~become a custom or a general course of conduct.
U. S. v. Forness, 125F. 2nd 928; ~Darvirris v. Boston Safe
. Deposit and Trust Co., 235 Mass. 76, 126 N. E. 382; cases
cited under 16 AUR 447- 448.
It would be going to quite an extent to say that respondents waived strict performance of these agreements and had
lulled appellants to sleep by accepting late or delinquent payments. Rather, respondents have never succeeded in waking up the appellants to their obligations. There have been
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three aggravated breaches of the three contracts. Respond·
ents in every case have sought to enforce their rights and
enforce the agreements according to their explicit terms.
The course of conduct shows that respondents have exhausted themselves in an effort to obtain the faithful performance of the appellants on each and every agreement. The
respondents did not want the premises, but wanted their investment sufficiently secured. Appellants have had evecy
opportunity to perform any and all of the agreements, and
respondents have afforded all possible leniencies to allow
appellants to buy the property involved. Appellants have
not been fair in their dealings with respondents, but at no
place in the record is there any showing that respondents
took advantage of appellants, or sought an unconscionable
or unjust enrichment by forfeiture.
Here we have on the one hand appellants who agreed
to buy more than they could probably afford, and on the
other respondents who were accommodation parties in financing the transaction. Appellants seek not to reinstate
themselves as purchasers, but to obtain damages and a penalty rebate - in effect to force respondents to buy back the
property as un·willing purchasers. Is it the policy of the
law to relieve the imprudent and make· a bad bargain a good
bargain? The appellants have sought to ·construe their status throughout as something it is not. They seek for "bargains," and to escape the consequences of their obligations.
Courts are created to enforce contracts that are not tainted
with fraud or coercion, and not to modify them. Stinson v.
Godbe, Utah (191H), 160 P. 280.
The equities in the case at bar are not the same as in
Perkins v. Spencer, supra, on which appellants rely to compute the amount of the penalty under not only the real esSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tate contract but under the two leases as well. Respondents did not at the first opportunity seek to retain the down
payment of purchasers, as in the Perkins v. Spencer case,
supra. Rather, they waited until the delinquency reached
$889.41 before they sought an attorney to protect their contract rights, which became substantially impaired, considering that respondents were making monthly mortgage payments on the same property (R. 30). It should be kept in
mind that respondents received not one penny as consideration for the loan, the $4000.00 down payment in cash being
given toP. K. Nielson, the original seller. Respondents ·were
in a position where they were dependent on the monthly
payments of appellants. Respondents in effect allowed appellants an equity of redemption by granting them a lease
of the premises with an option to reinstate the contract of
sale upon faithful performance of the lease. Respondents
did not have to cancel the contract of sale and enter into
a lease agreement. They could as well have sued for the
delinquent payments and the installments as they became
due. The first lease was breached, but foreclosure came not
yet, due to the entering into of another lease with an option
to purchase the equity, if any, ·by performing the lease and
entering into a new contract of sale giving credit on principal for all previous sums paid. This second lease contained an express provision on the part of appellants to forfeit everything concerning the property, in the event the
sum of $300.00 was not paid by August 31, 1950, which
amount was paid August 31, 1950 (R. 82, Defendants' Exhibit 2). Appellants again defaulted and they received a
notice to quit March 5, 1952. Did respondents now fore~close?
No, 5~ months elapsed before another notice to
quit was served August 12, 1952, during which time the apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pellants remained in possession without making or tendering any payments while trying to negotiate a loan (which
will be discussed in Ans·wer to Point 3) . The last mentioned
notice gave 34 days to quit the premises (R. 18). Appellants did not vacate, and this action was not commenced
until November 25, 1952. Still appellants made no payments
nor tendered any. The trial came on and went to judgment,
and no payments nor tenders were ever made to protect the
so-called term or right to reinstate the "contract of sale" as
provided in 78-36-10, U. C. A., 1953, and Comm. Block Realty Co. v. Merchant's Protective Ass'n, supra. The premises were surrendered April 11, 1953, to respondents, and
appellants never offered to apply the $331.30 net penalty
to reinstate the lease or the option to purchase and be saved
from a forfeiture. Rather the judgment became a lien on
the property involved, as well as on the home of respondents·, as provided by law. Appellants appeal for greater
damages and do not want the property.
By applying the penalty doctrine, the court has in effect allowed appellants in default to rescind their contract
by recovering their payments, except for the rental value
of the premises while they were in possession. Such a judgment does not allow the respondents anything for their contracts. A purchaser in default cannot claim ·back what he
has paid, and he is not entitled to rescission. 55 Am. Jur.
927, 994, Vendor and Purchaser, par. 535, 536, 601. Even
at that, respondents waited until the equity as represented
by the net penalty of $331.30 was almost used up before
they took action to foreclose. There was no unconscionable
forfeiture under the facts of this case; rather the equities
were in favor of the respondents.
The facts in this case are much different than those that
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impelled the Utah Supreme Court to prevent the forfeiture
of the sales contract according to its terms in the Perkins v.
Spencer case, supra. In the case at bar there are the following distinctions: Nearly a six-year period of dealings;
two subsequent inconsistent agreements to the contract of
sale; repeated and persistent defaults and breaches by purchasers-lessees; admitted delinquencies; admittedly tenants
at will; every possible opportunity to reinstate contract of
sale; an opportunity to pay up delinquencies at any time and
be restored to the estate; status as tenants rather than purchasers; failure to exercise options to purchase; financial
hardship of seller; accommodation transaction by seller from
outset; no unconscionable retention of funds by seller; no
exercise of time of the essence clause; no attempt to summarily foreclose the equity of purchasers.
Therefore, even if it be held that the two leases were in
fact extensions and modifications of the real estate contract
of sale of June 27, 1947, the Perkins v. Spencer case, supra,
is not applicable in equity or law to the ·case at bar. Under
all three instruments no penalty is suffered by allowing the
parties to stand as they were by enforcing the forfeiture
agreements as liquidated damages. In addition, in the Perkins v. Spencer case, the breach of the purchaser arose out
of a dispute regarding how the purchase price was to be
paid. In the case at bar the dispute arose out of the
breaches of the purchaser and how much was due to be
paid.
Respondents respectfully submit that the first and second lease agreements were in fact and truth leases, as they
purported to be on their face and intended by the parties,
and that by the provisions in the leases appellants' tenancy
was properly terminated as tenants at will; that appellants
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\vere not purchasers, but tenants of respondents, and that
there was no basis for granting appellants equitable relief
from forfeiture of sums paid either under the leases or under the contract of sa.le.
ANSWER TO POINT TWO

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
THAT THE NOTICES TO QUIT SERWID UPON APPELLANTS (PURCHASERS) COMPUIED WITH THE LAW
OF THE STATE OF UTAH ON UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
Appellants contend that because they were not tenants
at will of the lessors that the notice to quit of August 12,
1952, was not sufficient to remove them as tenants at will;
and that respondents had only a right to remove appellants
as tenants at will, if that right was properly exercised,
and quote cases that hold that such an option or right can
be exercised only upon giving a notice of an intention to
do so, and that suit for possession cannot be summarily
instituted upon default unless notice is given. In other
words, as we undertand it, appellants require an alternative
notice before they are to be given notice to quit, and that if
they are tenants for a term that the provision of paragraph
(4) of the second lease preserving to lessors the right to remove lessees in case of default as tenants at will is absolutely meaningless because lessees are entitled to live out
their term.
As stated in Answer to Point One, the intention in making the second lease was as stated in the fourth paragraph,
and as intending a forfeiture in the event of non-performance as shown in paragraph 1 (C). Even conceding that
the lease were for a specified term, the term is limited by
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the tenant at will provision. TP.e leases, as well as the contract of sale, provided that upon default the tenants may
be removed as tenants at will. In both leases appellants
acknowledged that they were tenants at will, had been constituted as tenants at will because of their default, and then
expressly covenanted that upon default they may be removed as tenants at will (R. 14, 16). Parties having acted
under the leases without disagreement are bound by their
interpretation of instruments, and neither can urge a different construction in his own interest after ·controversy
~rises. Hinkle v. Blinn, 92 Colo. 302, 19 P. 2nd 1038. If
such a provision is inconsistent with the alleged term tenancy, the term must give way to the expressed intention
and purpose of the parties. It should be noted that the lease
did not provide for a gross amount to be paid for the "term"
for which lessees would be liable, but stated the lease was
on a month to month basis (2 (a) of the second lease) and
that lessees were to become month to month tenants in paragraph 2 (b). Surely this more closely harmonizes with expressed intention of the parties that the option to purchase
was predicated upon faithful performance of the lease by
paying specified amounts of rents and taxes, etc., at the
times they are due. If lessees performed they were entitled
to remain in possession on a month to month basis for specified length of time in order to exercise the option to enter
into a new contract of sale (the old one terminated and was
non-existent). It would have been wrongful for lessors to
terminate the estate and incidentally the option, if the lessees were not in default. The opportunity to reinstate the
contract of sale was one of the primary objects of the lease,
but if the opportunity were rejected, the right to remove
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as tenants at will was purposely preserved as a specific
remedy.
At most, the lessees were month to month tenants, and
the notice of March 5, 1952, gave 26 days notice to quit before the next rent became due, and that the notice to quit
of August 12, 1952, gave 18 days notice to quit before the
next rent was due, both in compliance with 78-36-3 (2), Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit I and Defendants' Exhibit 5).
Even if appellants had a term tenancy, they did not
protect it under 78-36-10, U. C. A., 1953, and in fact made
no valid tender, as will be shown in Answer to Point Three,
and the court rightfully declared the term at an end under
said 78-36-10. The provision that lessors may, if lessees vacate or default, re-enter and le-let the premises does not
make a term tenancy. It was within the contemplation of
the parties that the option may be refused. The lessees
did not covenant to pay a gross amount for the term and
said provision allowed lessors the use of the land in case lessees did not faithfully perform and thus exercise the option
to purchase. None of the provisions in the leases give appellants a right to remain for a definite period if they· default in their payments. The protection provided lessors
was in the faithful performance of the lease by the lessees,
with the alternative to remove lessees and dispose of the
property. To ignore the leases is to take from lessors their
agreement and protection and enable the "purchasers" to
speculate in the value of the land at "sellers" risk. If the
property declined rapidly in value, the lessees were in a position to refuse to pay the original contract price by dropping the option and considering the payments ·as rents as
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they are now doing. The option was valuable to appellants,
as they state in their brief on P. 24.
It seems obvious from the terms of the lease as a whole
that this was not a term tenancy.
Appellants on P. 25-27 of their brief contend that they
were entitled to a notice that their term tenancy was declared a tenancy at will ·before the provision in the lease
could operate that they could be removed as tenants at will,
because the default did not automatically terminate the term
tenancy.
Respondents admit the necessity of giving the statutory notice required to terminate an estate created by the
contract, unless the notice required is modified by the contract. In the case at bar the notices to quit were in accordance with the statutes.
Cases are quoted by appellants at P. 27 of their brief,
where suit for possession was summarily brought without
giving notice of intention to treat the contract as ended.
These cases hold that either the contract must expressly be
made to void itself automatically and absolutely, upon default, or that notice is required to terminate the ·contract relations. It may be that in the case at bar, the relationship
between lessors and lessees was not automatically terminated. The question is not what the relationship was, but
how it was to be terminated. The parties agreed that upon
default by the lessees, that the lessors had the right to remove lessees as tenants at will. Five day notice to quit is
required by 1953 U. C. A. Section 78-36-3(2) to remove a
tenant at will. This was in fact given twice to lessees, as
admitted on P. 24 of appellants' brief.
Some point is made of the right to exercise the option
to terminate the agreement. This right was exercised and
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notice was given that the right was thereby exercised and
that therefore the tenants should quit the premises. If two
notices were required - one to notify of intention to exer:..
cise right of termination and one to terminate- these were
given. The notice to quit of March 5, 1952, said: "we hereby notify you that you have forefited the right to purchase
said property and your tenancy under said lease shall terminate on the 31st day of March, 1952" (Defendants' Exhibit 5). The notice to quit of August 12, 1952, notified
again the appellants and required that the premises be delivered up (Plaintiffs' Exhibit I).
If the leases were in truth extensions of the contract of
sale, then the leases themselves would operate as alternative
notices to pay up or surrender the premises and their rights
thereto. Some point is made of this alternative noti·ce, but
even on appellants' own theory that all three agreements
were contracts of sale, the alternative requirement is laid
to rest on a contract of sale by the case of Forrester v. Cook,
77_ Utah 137, 292 P .. 206, wherein it was held that a simple
five-day notice to quit not in the alternative was sufficient
to remove the vendee as a tenant at will when vendee was
in default.
It is felt by appellants that Pacific Development Co.
v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 P. 2nd 748, required notice
in the alternative to be given in the case at bar. That case
is not similar to the case at bar at all, in that here there
was no conduct or lulling to sleep of vendees to feel secure
in not strictly performing upon the promise that no forfeiture "at that time" was contemplated. In the case at bar
the forfeiture had already occurred under the contract of
sale by agreement of the parties, and no forfeiture for default had therefore been written into the leases. It was a
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rental agreement with an option, and the rights of the parties were to be determined under the second lease. The
court found that no waiver occurred under the last named
agreement because defendants had pleaded only that the
waiver of strict performance applied to the contract of sale
(R. 23-24, 44-46). If the subsequent leases were but contracts of sale, then the lease agreements themselves were alternative notices to pay up or get out, and the only question
remaining would ·be if the time given to pay up ·were reasonable of not. Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, supra.
The equities duscussed in this case are worthy of review
as applying to the case at bar.
The court found the lease agreements to be leases with
a monthly rent reserved upon certain conditions. If these
agreements were leases, then there could be no waiver of
performance such to require an alternative notice to pay
arrearages, as in the Pacific !Development Co. v. Stewart
case, supra.
"The covenant to pay rent is a continuing covenant
to which doctrine of waiver is inapplicable, and lessor
will not be estopped to claim right of possession of realty for non payment of rent merely because he permits defaults to ·continue for a time as to such payments." Title and Trust Co. v. Durkheimer Inv. c·o.,
155 Oreg. 427, 63 P. 2nd 909. A forfeiture may be declared by a landlord who is lenient in allowing nonpayment of rent to accumulate, and a waiver is not effected by such indulgence. Francis Bros. v. Schallberger,
137 Oreg. 529, 3 P. 2nd 530; Jones, Landlord and Tenant, par. 499.
At P. 32-33 of their brief appellants say the case of
Federal Land Bank of Berkeley v. Sorenson et al, 101 Utah
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305, 121 P. 2nd 398, does not apply because in the case at
bar waiver of strict performance was pleaded, whereas in
the cited case it ·was not. The case did not turn on that
point at all, but quotes the case of Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah
417, 34 P. 2nd 699, where no notice was given at all before
the suit for possession was commenced, and the forfeiture
provision of the contract was not self-executing. The rule
is that a notice of intention must be served upon defaulting
vendee where forfeiture provision is not self-executing, in
order to let the vendee know whether to vacate, expect to
be allowed to perform the contract, or expect to be sued for
accruals or specific performance. The Federal Land Bank
of Berkeley v. Sorenson case, supra, expressly decides at P.
400-401 that it is not the rule nor the practice to require
a notice in the alternative to pay arrearages or quit, when
the forfeiture provision is not self-executing. We respectfully submit that under the cases the respondents were not
required to serve an alternative notice, but only a notice of
intention to forfeit and demand for possession of the premises. This was done on two occasions in the case at bar,
as above set out, and according to the explicit remedy of the
leases and contract of sale that appellants may be removed
as tenants at will. The right existed and was exercised.
The notices involved complied with the statutes of the
State of Utah. Respondents could have given an alternative
notice, as provided under Section 78-36-3, subsection (3) or
(5), U. C. A. 1953, but were not required to do so. Those
subsections provide for an alternative remedy, even in the
case of a tenancy at will, where the lessor or vendor desires
the alternative of performance or possession to be timely
made. We respectfully submit, however, that the case at
bar is to be decided on the basis of Section 78-36-3 (2), in
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the case of month to month tenants or as tenants at will, under either of which categories the notices to quit herein
complied.
ANSWER TO POINT THREE

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING
THAT, AFTER MARCH 5, 1952, APPELLANTS MADE
NO TENDER OF SUMS DUE UNDER THE CONTRACTS,
IN REFUSING FURTHER TESTIMONY ON THIS ISSUE,
AND IN NOT SUBMITTING THE ISS·UE TO THE JURY.

Throughut appellants' brief the issue of tender is repeated and hammered upon incessantly, appellants claiming
tenders and offers, and the wrongful refusal by respondents of those tenders and offers. On page 32 of their brief,
appellants state that the record is replete· with evidence of
attempts and offers to pay up the contract, but turn around
and say that the court erred in refusing testimony as to
whether a tender had been made under the ·contracts. The
issue of tender is important only in two instances: first, if
the second lease constituted in fact a term tenancy such
that the appellants were entitled to reinstate themselves
for the balance of their term as provided in 78-36-10, U. C.
A., 1953; and second, if the court by the powers of equity
under the facts elected to save the appellants from a forfeiture either by way of construing the leases as contracts
of sale or by preventing the failure of the option to purchase
under the leases notwithstanding non-performance of the
lease covenants.
If the tenancy were a term tenan·cy, appellants have
waived a right to tender by not making a valid tender, not
keeping the tender alive, and not offering in open court within 5 days after judgment the amounts due to be restored to
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the estate, as provided in 78-36-10, supra, and as will be
shown hereafter regarding tender in fact and validity of
tender. Idaho has an identical statute to Utah's 78-36-10,
supra, and it was held in Brooks v. Coppedge, supra, that
lessees had not protected their term tenancy by paying the
amounts due as provided in the statute, and had therefore
been terminated by their own fault; that lessor was entitled
to rents or possession, and the lease was not terminated until five days after judgment. The record in the case at bar
is entirely silent as to any tender in court before, during,
or after the trial or judgment. The appellants did make an
offer of proof that a tender of all delinquencies under 2nd
lease had been made by appellants before the commencement of the action upon receipt of the notice to quit of
March 5, 1952, at which proffer of proof the trial judge
asked if that was all that was tendered, and counsel replied
with another offer, this time to refinance (R. 89-90).
If the leases were contract of sale and equity had
deemed to save the vendees from forfeiture thereunder, a
tender of all sums past due would have to be made, but only
if it were also found that vendors had waived strict performance to entitle vendees a reasonable time to make up
arrearages. This concept is already discussed under Answers to Point One and Two above.
If the lease option to purchase were to be reinstated,
even though the lease had fallen from lessees' default,a tender would have to be made of the sums due under the lease.
This is contrary to the cases which hold that when optionee
has failed to take advantage of the option according to its
terms, an offer of readiness to perform is too late; that where
the lease falls the option to purchase goes with it; and that
a refusal to accept past due rentals under a lease with option
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to purchase is justified, to preserve the right to declare a
forfeiture. Rushing v. Mayfield Co., 62 F. 2nd 318; Barcroft v. Livacich, 35 Cal. App. 2nd 710, 96 P. 2nd 951.
In appellants' counterclaim for affirmative relief, they
alleged that the contract of sale and deed were a mortgage
with an equity of redemption. This theory was held to and
not abandoned by the appellants until they wrote their brief
(R. 23, 25; Appellants Brief, P. 9). They also alleged they
\Vere contract purchasers under the contract of sale and
the two_ leases, and were not in default thereunder (R. 2324), and that a penalty against them was ~being worked regarding the liquidated damages and forfeiture (R. 24, 25).
Nowhere do appellants ask for damages for wrongful termination of contract, nor have the pleadings been anywhere
changed, except as appears in a minute Entry after the jury
trial and argument of counsel in reapplication of the law
to the facts, the appellants sought to amend to counterclaim
for damages for wrongful termination of contract (R. 76).
The motion was denied. Even if there had been a tender,
it would have no effect, as a matter of law, under the plea~
ings of appellants except for the denied motion for permis~
sion to amend the answer to counterclaim for damages for
wrongful breach of contract. At the time of the trial the
issue of tender was not therefore before the court.
Appellants had asked for a jury to try the issues of
fact reserved in the Memorandum Decision of February 21,
1953, with ten days reserved in which the parties could enter any objections or proposals they might have had to the
statement of issues reserved (R. 69, 49-50). No issue as to
tender was proposed by the appellants, and none was reserved to the jury. An offer of proof before the court (R.
89-90) was made that a tender had been made of payments
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due under the second lease. The court found against appellants on the matter of tender, and rightfully so, because
Swans never did tender enough to pay up the delinquency,
even assuming that Swans had the money to make a valid
tender. Mr. Swan's deposition and that of Mr. Jacobson
show that Swan was short of making up the delinquencies
all the time.
Let us examine the pleadings and the evidence with regard to this alleged tender, since on P. 28 of their brief, as
well as elsewhere, appellants contend they had pleaded tender and had prayed for specific performance of the contract.
Respondents fail to find any phraseology in the prayer of
the answer and affirmative defense (R. 24, 25) asking that
the contract of sale be specifically enforced. Nor do respondents find any pleading in the answer that a tender of
sums due under the second lease was made as is offered
for proof in the Partial Transcript (R. 23-23; 89-90).
Rather, the pleadings read that the defendants "offered to
the plaintiffs payment of all sums due at that time under
the schedule of payments of Exhibits A, B, and C, but plaintiffs refused said payment"; and "defendants then offered
to refinance the purchase" (R. 23) . It will be seen that appellants did not plead they would pay rents and taxes, etc.,
due under the second lease, but all sums due under all the
agreements. Let us see if this was done.
The Answer admits the non-payment of the amounts
set out in paragraph 26 of the Complaint that are due under the second lease agreement (R. 21, 9-10). These amounts
as alleged are $100 payment due for each of the following
months: November, 1950; January, 1951; January, 1952,
and March, 1952 (among others); taxes, 1950, of $102.59;
taxes, 1951, of $106.53 (1952 taxes due but unknown at
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time); $78.00 insurance premium; $9.50 water assessment.
These amounts are approximately $700 (not counting the
1952 taxes, of course) and all are past due and delinquent
at the time appellants allege a tender was made immediately
after receiving the notice to quit of March 5, 1952. In the
court's Analysis these amounts are repeated as delinquencies, and in the Findings of Fact they are repeated except
for the omission of a $100 payment for January, 1951 (R.
82, 97). Therefore, the amounts due at the time of the service of the Notice to Quit of March 5, 1952, were not less
than $596.62, under the second lease alone, and under the
Partial Transcript of offer of proof the appellant George
Swan offers to prove that he tendered repeatedly to the respondent payment of all that was delinquent under the second lease agreement (R. 89-90). Now let us look at the
deposition of appellant George Swan on this matter.
Beginning at page 8, Mr. Swan is asked if he ever
made a tender of the payments to Mr. and Mrs. Jacobson, to which he answered: "Through Attorney Sandgren, yes." Mr. Swan was asked how much money he
took to Mr. Sandgren's office and he answered: "four
hundred and some dollars, that covered delinquent
taxes for some two hundred dollars, one hundred dollars monthly payment, insurance, and two years' water
bill." When Mr. Swan was asked if he tendered it in
the form of ·cash, he answered "I had it with me. He
wouldn't accept it." On page 10 Mr. Swan reiterates
the payments he "tendered" which Mr. Sandgren refused to accept. Mr Swan, in answer to the question if
he had made any other tenders since then, answered:
"Yes, through Clyde Sandgren we made several approaches to have it refinanced and pay it off; but it
seemed we couldn't agree on the amount owing." When
asked if he had made any offer to pay the rent after
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March, 1952, Mr. S.wan answered: "Well, we made an
offer to pay off the entire contract; inasmuch as we
had failed the first time we supposed Mr. Jacobson no
longer wished that sort of thing, so we tried to take
over the entire contract . . . ." Mr. Swan testified that he had received an approval on a loan from
Clair Mortenson for $8400.00 in October, 1952 at pages
11-12, and on page 17 Mr. Swan admitted he knew that
the $8400.00 was not enough to pay off the balance due
respondents.
In the Memorandum Decision, the court says of the offer
to refinance the purchase, that "It isn't made to appear by
what agreement they could offer, and thereafter defend upon the basis of such offer, to pay eight months' delinquencies at that date. It doesn't appear in the original writings,
nor is it stated in the Answer. It does not therefore constitute a defense" (R. 44).
Not only was the question of tender not before the
court, but there was sufficient evidence on the question in
the depositions of the parties to show that no bona fide tender had ever been made by appellants, even on the amounts
due under the lease agreement "C", let alone the payments
due on all of the agreements "A", "B", and "C". Mr. Swan
testified to all the tenders and offers he had made and could
not have testified to any more. The appellants were bound
by their sworn testimony, and the court was justified in
finding there was no valid tender, nor any offer to refinance
the whole transaction; and if there were a right to have this
matter heard by the jury, appellants waived it by not objecting or proposing that it be included in the reserved issues of fact as provided in the Memorandum Decision (R.
50) , since this was ··chiefly a proceeding in equity, as disclosed by the pleadings. The appellants had in mind the obSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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taining of damages and a repayment of sums under the penalty theory. The record is silent as to a tender in open
court of any sums or payments to show good faith and keep
an alleged tender alive. Respondents respectfully submit
that in this case there is no evidence to sustain a finding of
a bona fide legal tender of sums due, but there is ample evidence and admissions of the parties involved, in their depositions, that no valid tender was ever made. The ·court's
finding on this should be sustained.
On pages 29 and 31 of their brief, appellants state that
by refusing the tender of sums due made March 5, 1952,
that the respondents wrongfully terminated the contract of
purchase, and that respondents are not entitled to treble
damages for unlawful detainer. Respondents contend there
was no legal tender at all that they were required to accept,
even if appellants' stated propositions on page 31 of their
brief are true. If the appellants were entitled to bring their
payments current, they never did by tender either to respondents or to the court. From Mr. Swan's deposition it
is plain to see that at no time, and certainly not at this late
date, have appellants been in a financial position to assume
the whole contract, even under the original terms. They
do not ask for the privilege of making a tender now, but
only to have the jury find a tender was made, in order to
allow damages for wrongful termination of contract. The
premises are surrendered, and no stay of judgment has been
requested. Appellants say on page 8 of their brief that of
course nothing further was paid after the notice to quit of
March 5, 1952. This does not follow logically, and the appellants had a duty to pay while they occupied the premises
and a duty to mitigate damages and to preserve their rights
by tendering into court or offering in writing as provided
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by the statutes of Utah, 78-27-1, 78-36-10, U. C. A., 1953.
Incidentally, appellants did not pay nor offer to pay the
attorney's fee incurred by respondents enforcing the second lease agreement, as mentioned on page 23 of Emil Jacobson's Deposition, and pages 15 and 19 of George Swan's
Deposition.
Also the "offer" to pay all sums due under "A", "B",
and "C", as alleged in appellants' Answer (R. 23) falls woefully short when it is understood that a large proportion of
the $889.41 delinquency agreed to be paid under the first
lease agreement was in fact not paid. The jury found that
$1440.00 had been paid on the principal and interest under
the first lease, which provided for a rental of $80 per month
which amounts to $960 for one year. Thus, under the first
lease it was agreed that $1849.41 be paid by the end of the
year, plus taxes and insurance, which were paid. For the
same year $1440.00 was paid, leaving a total delinquency
at the end of the year in the amount of $449.41 (R. 14, 16,
63, 96). This amount was never paid, and was not mentioned in the second lease agreement. If it be held that this
delinquency was waived, then it should be held that by the
same reasoning appellants' claim to a penalty was waived.
At least a new agreement was entered into, and considering
the original contract terms, the original contract of sale
was never kept up to date according to its terms. This is
another reason for sustaining the holding of the lower court
that the lease agreements ·were not extensions or modifications of the contract of sale, but were complete and entire
in themselves and referred to the old contract only for the
purpose of fixing the consideration for the new (R. 44-46).
Legal tender of the amounts due under the second lease was
not pleaded by appellants as they plead an offer of sums due
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under the schedule of payments of Exhibits 'A", "B", and
"C", and an offer to refinance. The court found against
the appellants in the Findings of Fact (R. 23, 98) regarding
what had been pleaded.
One other matter is worthy of note on "tender" of all
sums due claimed by appellants regarding the "blocking"
of appellants' efforts to refinance the whole obligation when
they had re·ceived a commitment so to do (R. 23, Appellants' Brief, P. 11, 32., 33). The depositions quoted showed
a commitment in October, 1952, from Clair Mortenson for
$8400.00 (not before the second notice of August 15, 1952,
as claimed in their brief) that respondents blocked by claiming $9600.00 due. At the outset, appellants claimed $2000$4000 more had been paid than the jury found (Plaintiffs'
Exhibit "J"), and as stated on page 11 of their brief, the issue had to be resolved by the jury to be sure.
If appellants had paid $80 per month regularly, as provided in the contract of sale, by the time of the trial they
would have paid three months less than·six years, and would
have paid the principal of $10,000 balance due at inception
of contract, down to $6942.84. Of total payments of $5520.00, $2462.84 would apply on interest and $3057.16 on principal, at the same time ~being delinquent, as in fact they
were, for 1950, 1951, and 1952 taxes amounting to approximatly $325, fire insurance premium for 1950, 1951, and 1952
of $78.00, and water assessment of $9.50. The jury found
that appellants had paid for the same period (even where
leases provided for $100 instead of $80 per month) but
$4400.00. Being behind then $1120 would naturally increase
the interest accrued and decrease the prin·cipal as above calculated. It can be seen from this that the amount of interest appellants should have paid under the original real esSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tate sales contract was well in excess of $2500.00; and by
adding taxes, fire insurance premium, and water assessment, amounting in all to about $400, attorney's fees of
$204.40, paid to Attorney Clyde Sandgren by Jacobsons,
and $350 for prosecuting action to protect respondents'
rights under the contracts (Swan's [)eposition, P. 15, 19;;
R. 82-83, 97) the amount left of the $4400 paid by appellants to apply on the $10,000 original balance is less than
$1000 in any event. So to get out whole, even under appellants' theory of applying the terms of the original contract, respondents were entitled to an amount in excess of
$9000.00. The most that appellants could borrow was
$8400.00, as shown above. Clearly, if the alleged tender was
made to pay off the original real estate contract, the respondents would be entitled to interest at 5%, as stated
therein.
Under the law appellants never effected a valid tender.
"A mere offer to pay does not constitute a valid
tender; the law requires that the tenderer have the
money present and ready, and produce and actually offer it to the other party. Tender implies the physical
act of offering the money or thing to be tendered. The
law requires an actual, present, physical offer; it is not
satisfied by a mere spoken offer to pay, which, although
indicative of present intention to produce it, is unac-·
companied by any visible manifestation of intention to
make the offer good." 52 Am. Jur., 219, Tender, par.
7.

"The thing to ·be tendered must be actually produced and proffered to a party entitled thereto; a mere
offer to pay being insufficient. The tenderer must place
the money or property in such a position that his control over it is relinqunshed for a sufficient time to enSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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able the tenderee, if he so desires, to reduce it to possession by merely reaching out and laying hold of the
money or thing; and a person is not bound to say whether or not he will accept the money or thing until it is
produced." 62 CJ 672-673, Tender, par. 41.
The party relying on a tender, either defensively or for
affirmative relief, must plead a valid tender, including the
date and amount tendered and its refusal. Especially is it
necessary to allege present readiness and willingness to pay
where the debt or obligation is not discharged hy tender
and its refusal. 52 Am. Jur. 248, Tender, par. 48.
A tender must be kept good and the money be paid into
court or an averment be made of a readiness and willingness·
to pay the same on the order of the court, especially where
the amount due is in dispute. Weigell v. Gregg, 161 Wis.,
413, 154 NW 645; LeVine v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109
P. 2; Hirsh v. Ogden Furniture Co., 48 Utah 434, 160 P. 283;
62 CJ 693, Tender, par. 87.
Tender must be made for the full amount at the peril
of the tenderor, and a tender of a less amount is his misfortune. The tender must include all damages suffered or expenses incurred by the creditor by reason of the default of
the debtor. Where contract contains absolute provisions
for the payment of attorneys fees, the tender must include
them. 62 CJ 660-662, Tender, par. 6, 9.
Appellants had a copy of the second lease agreement
signed by the respondents which recited the days and
amounts of the payments due thereunder (Swan's Deposition, page 6). Appellants knew or should have known what
payments were due and unpaid. To not pay the right
amount is another evidence of bad faith on the part of the
appellants, who now ask the court to remand this case for
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determination of damages for wrongful termination of "contract" for refusal to accept tender of rents, taxes, insurance
premium, and water assessment due under the second lease.
Even under a term lease, if the amount of rent tendered is not enough, the lease is forfeited and terminated.
Barlow v. Hoffman, (1938) Colo., 86 P. 2nd 239; McCray
v. Kelly, (1939) Tex. Civ. App., 130 SW 2nd 458.
Tenders by tenant under a lease of insufficient amounts
of rent is equivalent to no tenders at all, and is not a defense
in summary proceeding for unlawful detainer. Commercial
Block Realty Co. v. Merchants' Protective Ass'n, 71 Utah
505, 267 P. 1009. No tender in writing was ever made and
no deposit in court.
Respondents respectfully submit that no valid tender
of amounts due under second lease was ever made, and that
no bona fide offer was ever presented to pay off the whole
obligation, as admitted ·by George W. Swan, appellant, in his
deposition. The transcript of the trial record on an offer of
proof of tender requested for this record on appeal by appellants (R. 111) is not argued in appellants' brief. Point
3 of appellants brief assigns as error the finding of the
court that appellants made no tender of sums due under
the contracts. This is not the same as finding no tender made of rents and taxes due under the second lease
alone. The ·court, then, did not err in making the finding
of fact that no offer to pay under contracts, or offer to refinance, was ever made (R. 98).
POINT ONE ON CROSS-APPEAL
THE COURT ERRED IN HO·LDING THAT THERE
IS A PENALTY IN THIS CASE ARISING OUT OF EXSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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HIBITS "A", "B", AND "C" A'ITACHED TO THE COMPLAINT, OR EITHER OF THEM, AND IN LIMITIN1G
THE AMOUNT OF RECOVERY OF THE· ·PLANTIFFS,
.AN[)
IN AWARDING DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS FOR THE SUM OF $331.30 TOGETHER WITH INTEREST, BECAUSE THE COURT
HELD, AND RIGHTuY SO, THAT EXHIBIT "A" WAS
MUTUALLY TERMINATED BY AGREEMENTS OF THE
PARTIES, EXHIBITS "B" AND "C'", AND. THEREBY
THEY MUTUALLY. RELEASED AND DISCHARGED
EACH OTHER FROM ALL OBLIGATIONS ARISING
OR GROWING OUT OF EXHIBIT "A", BY EXECUTING
EXHIBITS "B" AND "C", AND BY THEREBY ESTABLISHING THE RELATIONSHIP OF LESSORS AND LESSEES, THE LESSEES BECOMING TENANTS AT WILL
AND THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN NO O·FFSET, BY
USING ANY AMOUNTS PAID ON EXHIBIT "A" BY
SWANS AGAINST THE AMOUNT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER.

The arguments previously set out in answer to appellants Points One to Three, whereby respondents submit
that the two lease agreements were new, separate, independent, and inconsistent in regard to the contract of sale (R.
42); that the contract of sale was mutually terminated by
the two leases; that the appellants were lessees and not vendees removable as tenants at will of respondents are hereby incorporated by reference herein.
The court rightfully held the contract of sale to be
mutually terminated by agreement between the parties upon entering into the two lease agreements (R. 45), and that
the rights and obligations of the parties are to be deterSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mined under the last contract, Exhibit "C' (the second
lease) (R. 42). However, the court then proceeded to offset what was due respondents under the second lease agreement by an alleged penalty suffered by appellants under
the mutually terminated agreement- the contract of sale.
This, we respectfully submit, was error. Cannot two parties dealing at arm's length agree to forfeiture or a settling
of accounts for a valuable consideration. 12 Am. Jur. 1011,
1013, 1038, 1040, Contracts, par. 431, 433, 455, 457, Ocean
Accident and Guaranty Co. v. Meek, 61 Utah 426, 215 P.
810. Under this last named case, a mutually rescinded contract is held to no longer exist in legal effect, and no cause
of action may be brought upon it by either party.
As before indicated, appellants had prerogatives and
options under the leases that they did not have previously,
and respondents had lost the consideration of their bargain
and the right to specifically enforce the sale. The respondents had to carry the risk and the appellants could reinstate
their original contract of sale or not, as- they chose. Respondents did not have to cancel the contract, but could
have enforced the performance or sued for the installments
as they became due, at the expense of the buyer. For the
court to say that the parties didn't mean to stand by their
solemn agreements at the times the agreements were consummated, and to say that it was inequitable for appellants
to agree to such, or that it was inequitable for them to de~
cide to drop their option to buy, is an invasion of the right
of contract. If the penalty doctrine applies to a mutually
terminated contract, it is impossible for parties to cancel a
contract without the phantom-penalty hovering in the backgrol.md for either party to call forth -as an ally when conditions change enough to assert themselves. The penalty
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was not asserted at the time of the cancellation of the contract.
By applying the penalty to the contract of sale the court
has in effect allowed the defaulting vendees to rescind the
contract and has placed them in a status as renters for the
entire period. As before pointed out, no unconscionable conduct or unfair advantage is shown in the record. The dealings were above.,jboard and understood by all the parties at
each step of the transaction. All the Depositions are to that
effect. The appellants have been in defu.ult on all of their
contracts.
By entering into the leases with option to purchase,
appellants got more than they would have received by applying the Perkins v. Spencer doctrine, supra, namely, possession of the premises with an option to purchase title at
seller's risk, whereas under the penalty theory they were
entiltled to an accounting. What if the property rapidly
declined in value,or was damaged or destroyed? Could not
then the appellants choose not to exercise the option? The
respondents would not ibe able at that time to specifically
enforce the sale. The parties so understood. Appellants
have had their reasons for their choice of procedure in not
wanting to be contract purchasers, and even if they hadn't,
they have not carried their share of the load, as evidenced
by the delinquency of taxes, insurance, water assessments
and attorney's fees from the outset of the transaction, never
having paid any of these unless forced to do so. Respondents feel very strongly that appellants have not clean hands
while asking for equity in this matter.
If the penalty under the first contract is considered
held in abeyance by the parties pending the outcome of the
exercise of the option to purchase, this would make a deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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termination of the fact that a retention of payments for
default constituted a penalty depend on future circumstances. This being so, at the time of the trial the equities were
nearly balanced, as reflected in the net penalty amount adjudged for appellants of only $331.30. Therefore, at the
time of the trial there was no penalty, and it was error to
apply the penalty doctrine of Perkins v. Spencer, supra.
Under appellants' own theory, if all three agreements were
contracts to sell the premises involved, then under all three
contracts there was no penalty at the time of trial. To so
hold, in effect, allows the appellants to rescind their agreements, treat themselves as renters, and to enforce a purchase of the premises at the end of their dealings against
the respondents, in spite of persistent defaults by the appellants and constant readiness to perform by the respondents. This denies to respondents the benefits of their contracts, and places a great burden upon them, with no remedy against the constantly defaulting possessors of the
property.
To hold that the parties mutually terminated an agreement, and then hold that it effected a penalty against one
of theparties who received a consideration therefore in receiving a new agreement is inconsistent and contrary to the
right of contract. The policy of law is discussed in 49 Am.
Jur. 75, Specific Performance, par. 60. Specific performance has been lost to respondents in this instance, because
of the mutually terminated contract and the nature of the
new agreement to lease.. Respondents could not obtain
specific performance of the leases, because there was no
obligation on the part of appellants to stay in possession,
nor pay for a whole term, nor exercise the option to purchase, nor enter into a new real estate sales contract.
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Respondents were entitled to receive payments for the,
amounts of the rent payable in advance, taxes, insurance
premiums, and water assessment, for the time appeHants
retained possession of the property. We submit that while
the rights and obligations of the parties are determined ·by
the second lease agreement (R. 42), that the amounts due
thereunder were not subject to any offset for a penalty
suffered by the appellants, and that the respondents should
have been awarded judgment as prayed for in their complaint (R. 11) for the rents, taxes, insurance premium, water assessment, and treble damages since September 15,
1952 free and clear of any set-off of the appellants.
In the conclusion and prayer of their brief, appellants
ask this Court to find that all three agreements are one contract of sale, and that respondents are entitled only to rental for the time the premises were occupied. This ignores
the leases completely, and in effect asks for a rescission;
and this plea im made admitting that appellants have
breached all three agreements, and assuming that their
breaches have continually bettered their position. The Perkins v. Spencer case never announced such a doctrine. Are
not respondents entitled to anything for the ·broken ·covenants, trampled contracts, attorneys' fees to draw up contracts and obtain possssion? The appellants feel they can
ignore the agreements completely, pay as they please, and
be liable only for a rental value. This is· a speculation in
land values at vendor's risk.
The court holds that appellants are not entitled to rescission of "A" because it was mutually terminated, and that
"B" had expired according to its terms, but that appellants
were not entitled to rescission of "C" because they were admittedly in default (R. 46). Appellants are in effect askSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing for a resc1Ss1on of all three "contracts", but under
all three there is no penalty as of the time of this suit. The
rental basis is part of the method of determining the vendor's damages, once it has been decided that there is in truth
a penalty involved. The law concedes, however, that the
vendor is entitled to a fair return on his investment. A forfeiture will be enforced when the contract so provides, unless it is shocking to the conscience of the Court, whereupon
the forfeiture becomes a penalty. Perkins v. Spencer, supra.
In Perkins v. Spencer, the case of Cooley v. Call is quoted approvingly, wherein it was held that a forfeiture of an
amount that figured at a 10% (without taxes) or 12%
(with taxes that were paid) per annum return on the purchase price was not unconscionable nor unreasonable. In
the case at bar the total $8687.41 paid is but 10.3% per
annum return of the $14,000 purchase price for six years,
and of the $4687.41 paid respondents on the $10,000 "loan"
it is but 7.8% per annum return on what respondents had
in the deal. The $4000 paid of the $8687.41 was paid to the
original seller, P. K. Nielson (R. 33-34). Hence, under appellants' own theory of the case, there was no penalty.
In the Complaint respondents asked for such relief as
may be equitable and just. The court adopted the findings
of the jury and applied the iaw regarding the issues of this
case (R. 96) . The first lease called for the payment of $80
rent per month for one year and the payment of the $889.41
delinquency remaining under the terminated real estate contract, making a total amount due for the year of $1849.41
(R. 14) . The jury found that under this first lease the appellants paid $1440.00, plus the taxes, insurance premium
and attorney's fee as required (R. 63). (The $100 attorSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ney fee should not be included in the $8687.41 paid on the
transaction, as computed by appellants). The difference
between the $1849.41 due and the $1440.00 paid is $409.41
that was never paid by appellants. This delinquency was
not mentioned in the second lease, and respondents did not
sue for it specifically in the Complaint, but asked for
amounts due under the last agreement Exhibit "C". However, it is submitted that if the penalty be allowed to stand in
this matter, that this amount of $409.41 due under the first
lease ·be allowed as a credit against the amount of the penalty. The respondents are entitled to this amount due and
owing from the appellants under the first lease agreement.
As another credit, the respondents feel they are entitled
to have appellants pay the $204.40 attorney's fees paid Attorney Clyde D. Sandgren for services rendered regarding
the enforcing of the second lease agreement (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "E"; Jacobson's Deposition, P. 23; Swan's Deposition,
P. 15).
In the court's Analysis (R. 82-83) no credit was given
for the 1952 general taxes ($93.42 plus interest) nor the
personal property taxes attached to the property ($30.62
plus interest) that appellants had agreed to pay under the
second lease (Plaintiffs' Exhibits "C" and "D"). The court
erred in not including these amounts as due respondents
under the lease. The appellants remained in possession under the lease until September 15, 1952, and were in fact in
possession until April 11, 1953 (R. 18, 104, 122). If it be
held that appellants were not required to pay the taxes
while in unlawful detainer, then respondents are entitled to
at least the proportionate amounts of these taxes up to September 15, 1953, or 9%-twelfths thereof. If it be held that
the second lease was a term lease, then appellants would be
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liable for the full amount, as the lease was not ended until
the term expired, or five days after judgment in which lessees failed to pay into court the amount of the judgment.
Brooks v. Coppedge, supra.
Respondents also submit that the trial court was in error in limiting the amount of treble damages awarded to respondents from September 15, 1952, to March 15, 1953, to
$255.00 per month, being three times the sum of $85.00 per
month (said $85.00 per month being the amount fixed by
the jury as the rental value) , whereas it should have awarded respondents as treble damages for said period, the sum
of $300.00 per month, being three times the agreed rental
of $100.00 per month, which was agreeed to by the parties
in the second lease. Damico v. Riedel, infra; Hlarris v. Bissell, 54 Cal. App. 307, 312; 202 P. 453.
The respondents respectfully submit that there was no
penalty involved under the facts of this case, and that the
court erred in applying the doctrine of penalty to the mutually terminated contract of sale. It was also error not to
credit respondents with the above amounts referred to.
Judgment should have been awarded the respondents for
the relief prayed for in the Complaint, together with the
above amounts, and not subject to offset by any penalty
claimed by the appellants.
POINT TWO ON CROSS-APPEAL
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
TillS ACTION IS NOT BROUGHT TO ENFORCE EITHER
EXHIBITS "A", "B" OR "C", AND THAT PIJ.AIN'l1FtFS
ARE NOT E·NTITLED TO ANY JUDGiv.IENT WHATSOEVER FOR ATrORNEYS FEES.
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In the court's Analysis attorney's fees were not allowed
respondents "in the offset against the penalty." Reasonable
attorney's fees had been set by the jury at $500 (R. 84, 64).
The reason given for the disallowance was that the agreemen sued under had been cancelled by the notice to quit of
August 12, 1952, and that the suit brought thereupon was
not to enforce the agreemnt but only to enforce rights thereunder. The case of Forrester v. Cook, supra, was cited
therein as authority that a suit in unlawful detainer was not
an action on the contract, and that therefore no attorney's
fees are allowable as provided in the contract.
The case at bar is different from the case of Forrester
v. Cook, supra, where a contract of sale of real estate was
terminated and unlawful detainer brought for treble damages against the purchasers, the court allowing the forfeiture of all payments made on the contract. Since the court
allowed the damages as provided in the contract, the only
question that remained being for summary possession of the
property. In the instant case the Complaint asked for accruals under the terms of the lease, restitution of premises,
and treble damages for unlawful detainer. The court refused to allow the forfeited damages as provided for in the
contract that had been mutually terminated by the parties
(R. 80), but instead allowed the counterclaim of defendants,
appellants, and awarded to them a penalty judgment at the
same time allowing to plaintiffs the accruals due under the
second lease, as prayed for in the Complaint, and under
which lease the court said the rights of the parties should
be determined (R. 42, 82, 83) .
It should be noted that the ·court speaks of the amounts
of taxes, accrued rents, insurance premium, and water assessment due respondents as an offset against the penalty
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(R. 83-84), inferring that the plaintiffs were allowed an offset and not affirmative judgment. The court must then feel
that a suit to collect accruals under a lease is not enforcii}g
the agreement and that respondents are not therefore entitled to an attorney's fee.
Unlike the Forrster v. Cook case, supra, the court in
the instant case did not allow the forfeiture or the agreement of the parties to terminate the contract to have any
effect, and in truth allowed appellants a rescission and returned the parties to the status quo. In other words the
court did not allow recovery as provided in the contracts,
nor as agreed by the parties.
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the joinder
of causes of action and permissive Counterclaim relax greatly the old rules that a claim for accrued rent be not necessarily joined in a possessory action in unlawful detainer and
that a counterclaim is not permissible in an unlawful detainer action. Voyles v. Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 P. 913.
Harris v. Bissell, 54 Cal. App. 307, 202 P. 453. White v.
District Court, Utah, 232 P. 2nd 785.
Where the burden of suit is thus enlarged, the provision
for payment of attorney's fees should be more stringently
enforced against the defaulting party. In the case at bar
the complications involved in the action are not the fault
nor the doing of respondents. The Complaint was filed to
obtain possession and to collect accruals due under the lease.
The case of Peterson v. Hodges, (1951) Utah, 239 P. 2nd
180, 182, holds that even where a lease is surrendered and
the landlord must sue for accruals due and owing prior to
the surrender, attorney's fees are assessable when the lease
provides therefor. The agreement to pay attorney's fees is
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ages arising at the same time as the obliga~ion which is sued
upon, i. e., prior to the surrender. Even the surrender of
a lease does not cut off this right.
Where lessee sought rescission of lease, and where lessor cross-complained for rents due where lease provided attorney's fees in event suit brought to collect rents due thereunder, it was held lessor entitled to attorney's fees on suit
to enforce the payment of rents. Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware and Paper Co., (1943) Calif., 142 P. 2nd 50.
Where lease provided that lessees would pay reasonable attorney's fees to lessors in event it became necessary
to bring an action under the lease, lessors were entitled to
rcover attorney's fees in accordance with provisions of the
lease in an unlawful detainer action. Damico v. Riedel, Cal.
App., 212 P. 2nd 52.
Under appellants' theory of the case, they do not want
any of the contracts enforced, but to obtain damages as penalty. They are not enforcing any of the agreements, nor
have they attempted to do so. The appellants have been allowed to counterclaim for damages, and the respondents
are attempting to enforce the lease agreements against them,
and respondents sought possession and rents accrued, and
taxes, and insurance premiums, and water assessment. The
action was necessarily one to enforce the lease agreements.
It is re~pectfully submitted that it was error for the court
to deny respondents a reasonable attorney's fee.
CONCLUSION
Respondent~

have answered Point Four on page 21 of

this Brief.
Tt1e quotatio~s from the Restatement of the Law o{ .Property quoted by appellants on page 26 of their brief is '
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merely recitative of the law stated in the case of Leone v.
Zuniga, supra. The right to remove appellants as tenants
at will was a "power of termination" which was an ability
to produce a change in the given legal relation by giving the
notice of termination. The interest subject to such a power
of termination is terminated by any appropriate manifestation upon the part of the person in whose favor the condition exists, of his intent thereby to terminate the interest
in question. American Law Institute Restatement of the
Law of Property, Par. B of Sec. 24, Sec. 3, and Introductory
Note to Chapter 4, page 118. The notices given were proper to divest the appellants of any term tenancy they may
have had as provided in the condition subsequent of the second lease.
Respondents respectfully request this Court to determine that the real estate contract was rightfully and mutually terminated by agreement of the parties; that any penalty, if any, was waived by agreement of the parties, namely,
the two leases, and by breaches thereof; that there is no
penalty in this case and the rule in Perkins v. Spencer does
not apply herein; that no valid tender of payments has been
made, or if made at any time, such tender has been waived
by appellants; that the notices to quit are good; that assuming that they were not good, that appellants have waived
noti·ce and any damage resulting from such failure, if any,
by their failure to apply to the court for relief under 78-3610, U. C. A., 1953, and by their acts and conduct in failing
to post a stay bond in this case and by voluntarily surrendering the premises in dispute; that this Court should award
respondents the amounts prayed for in the Complaint and
the amounts mentioned herein under Point One on Cross
Appeal; award respondents a reasonable attorneys fee; deny
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appellants any attorneys fee or costs; that respondents be
awarded their .costs and such further relief as may be just.
Respectfully submitted,
MORGAN AND PAYNE,
Attorneys for Respondents
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